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1. Introduction, motivation and approach 
1.1 Motivation of the study 
Among the four so-called Dublin principles (ICWE 1992) representing the pillars of the 
worldwide acknowledged concept of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), 
stakeholders’ participation is the one calling for the definition of river basin management 
at the lowest appropriated level. This refers to the concept of decentralization of water 
management and governance. Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper (2005) indicate that 
effective decentralization requires devolution of authority and responsibility from the 
center, and acceptance of that authority and responsibility by local entities in the basin. 
This concept gained acceptance after the International Conference on Water and 
Environment in Dublin in 1992, and supported by neoliberal institutions including the 
World Bank (Gleik 2002).  For example, the World Bank Board took the lead by 
endorsing a water resource management policy paper that outlined a policy and strategy 
for Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), which has been used as the basis 
for water resource management throughout the world (World Bank 1993a). In Southern 
Africa, like in most developing countries, the World Bank supported the same reforms. 
To this effect, the World Bank coordinated a regional water resource management 
workshop at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe, which detailed how to plan integrated water 
resource management (World Bank 1993b).  
As a consequence of the acceptance of the IWRM, most African countries voted 
their water laws in the past fifteen years, and restructured their institutional and 
governance framework accordingly. For instance, South Africa instituted its national 
water act in 1998 followed by its national water resources strategy in 2002. Zimbabwe 
passed its water act in 1998; Zambia amended in 1994 its water act of 1970, while 
Mozambique and Tanzania approved their national water policies in 1995 and in 2002, 
respectively; Namibia passed its water resource management act in 2004.  
The African governments have been implementing the approved water laws and 
policies. In Mozambique, the first national water law created five regional water 
administration agencies (ARAs) to implement integrated water resource management at 
the river basin level across the country. In Zimbabwe, the new water act established 
catchment and sub-catchment councils to manage seven major watersheds identified in 
the country in an attempt to decentralize the water management. South Africa’s 1998 
water act established nineteen water management areas (WMAs). Within each WMA, the 
law established the progressive creation of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs), 
sub-catchments entities (Catchment Management Committees – CMCs) and water user 
associations (WUAs). 
While much effort and goodwill were put into decentralization reforms in many 
basins in the continent, results have not been uniformly realized. For instance, the 
benefits originated from the implementation of such decentralization processes were 
taken for granted during the design of the South Africa National Water Act. However, ten 
years after the launch of the new national water policy, only two CMAs have been 
established and are operational (Inkomati and Olifants-Doorns). Moreover, many WUAs 
still struggle to find their place and role in the complex and sometimes confused context 
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of water management in South Africa, while the Catchment Management Committees 
(CMCs)2 exist only on paper, as they are forums with no decisional power. In other 
African countries, the process of decentralization in the water management institutions is 
even less advanced than in South Africa.  
In Mozambique, for instance, in the early 1990s the water sector was highly 
centralized with all planning, implementation, operational responsibilities, and functions 
at the central level were performed by the National Directorate for Water. With the 
approval of the new water law (1991), the sector implemented comprehensive 
decentralization reforms by progressively setting up ARAs. The only ARA currently fully 
operational is ARA-Sul (South). ARA-Sul is responsible for the southern part of the 
country. As for the other regional water authorities, ARA Centro is already functioning, 
but needs continuing support, and ARA Zambezi is newly established. ARA Centro-
Norte and ARA Norte have not yet been established.  
In Zimbabwe, in 1998 the government promulgated its Water Act and the 
Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) Act. The new water acts established the 
creation of catchment and sub-catchment councils to manage seven major watersheds in 
an endeavor to decentralize water management. According to Musinake (2011), after 
almost fifteen years from its start, water decentralization in Zimbabwe is less likely to 
make a dent on livelihoods. For catchment communities to realize any meaningful 
benefits of decentralization and participation, it is critical that legislation, which includes 
both acts and the statutory instruments to mediate decentralization, is revisited and 
perfected.   
In terms of water service provision, in Tanzania there is a broad consensus that 
the decentralization efforts through the local government reform program (LGRP) have 
brought better services closer to the poor people (e.g., access to rural water supply has 
increased from 43% in 1990 to 53% in 2005). Yet, the deficiencies in quantity and 
quality of services at local levels are still enormous (Egli and Zürcher 2007). 
The process of water management decentralization in African countries is seen as 
a means of advancing river basin management at the lowest appropriate level. Although 
efforts in this direction are clearly identifiable in the continent, the very different stage of 
advancement in the African river basins’ agencies witnesses the difficulty of 
implementing decentralization in practice.  
It seemed necessary in this context to understand why some water agencies have 
succeeded more than others, what variables are involved in such reform process, which 
variables have a positive or a negative impact on the implementation of decentralization 
processes in the African water sector, and which variables could be affected by policy 
interventions and how. For this purpose, the specific objectives of the study are: (i) 
Analyze the factors that have potentially affected the results of decentralization process in 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) basins, and (ii) Analyze the performance of the 
decentralization process in SSA basins.  To answer the above objectives, this report uses 
and adapts to the local context an analytical framework developed for the same purposes 
elsewhere (Kemper et al. 2007).  Different from past studies, the analytical and empirical 
                                                          
2CMCs were supposed to create a link between the CMAs and the WUAs. 
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framework developed in this report includes impacts of climate change and the 
transboundary nature of SSA basins in the analyses.  
Past studies on the water management decentralization process have not fully 
addressed these issues.  Kemper et al. (2007) initiated an investigation that was aimed at 
understanding the reasoning for a) initiation of the decentralization process, and b) 
variability in both initiation efforts and success of the decentralization process. 
The general review in Mody (2004) yielded several important conclusions and 
research implications regarding the usefulness of comparative analyses of river basin 
decentralization processes. First, decentralization is a long-term process. It may fail at 
any stage and take turns, subject to internal and external shocks. Therefore, a snapshot of 
the decentralization process could be misleading in its comparative success or failure. 
Second, each river basin is a special case that cannot be compared to other basins.  
Therefore, the decentralization process that was designed to address conditions in one 
basin may not be relevant to another. Third, conclusions based on this case study 
approach should not imply that due to the unique conditions in a given basin it should be 
excluded from becoming a potentially good candidate for learning from extrapolating its 
experience to other basins. And finally, any type of cooperation among the various 
parties involved in the management of the basin water and other resources is a predictor 
for a stable and successful decentralization process (Blomquist et al. 2007: 229-238). 
The comprehensive work by Kemper et al. (2007) has not addressed several 
important aspects. First, their analyses, both the case studies and the econometric ones, 
did not include basins from Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Due to that exclusion, they 
omitted some important aspects of the decentralization process that, while being unique 
to SSA, are very much relevant to other continents.  International river basins in SSA 
cover more than 60% of land territory. Having a local basin nested in a transboundary 
basin arrangement (which some basins in SSA are subject to) would suggest additional 
explanation to success or failure of decentralization.  We will expand on this aspect in 
Chapter 7.   
And second, Kemper et al. (2007) conducted their analyses in isolation from 
likely climate change impacts on the water cycle. Climate change affects the inter- and 
intra-annual variability of water flow.  SSA is one of the most climate-change-prone 
regions (Alavian et al. 2009). Dinar et al. (2010, 2011) claim that many basin-level 
management decisions are made with future perspectives in mind. They identified an 
inverted U shape of the likelihood for basin cooperation with regard to water scarcity and 
flow variability. We build on their analysis to establish several hypotheses with regard to 
the need, speed, and likely success of decentralization in SSA, and with regard to climate 
change and precipitation/flow variability. It is this set of considerations that this study 
will address, departing from the analytical framework in Dinar et al. (2007). 
No quantitative analytical framework to understand the factors of success and 
failure of decentralized water governance similar to the one adopted in this study has 
been applied to African catchments previously. The only examples of quantitative 
analysis to study water decentralization processes found in the literature are a case study 
run in Ghana (IBRD/WB 2007), and a recent study (Gallego-Ayala and Juizo 2012) in 
Mozambique. The first study uses a network analysis, while the second uses quantitative 
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synthetic indexes to assess the performance of river basin organizations to implement 
integrated water resource management. Several qualitative studies look at 
decentralization of water management and services in South Africa, particularly 
(Wijesekera and Sansom 2003; Chancellor 2006; and Zenani 2007), but no quantitative 
framework is proposed or applied so far. 
1.2 Study approach 
In order to investigate the process and performance of river basin decentralization in Sub 
Saharan Africa, a two-tiered approach was developed in the study reported here. First, a 
detailed application of the case study approach in Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2008) 
was implemented in three river basins in Southern Africa (first phase). While the case 
study analyses highlight the direction in decentralization of river basin management, they 
do not permit the identification of generic reasons and forces behind the decentralization 
process and its performance.  Thus a quantitative analysis of basins in SSA took place 
(second phase) based on the same analytical framework. This SSA study allowed an 
analysis of determinants of the water decentralization process and performance in the 
Continent.   
1.3 Scope of the study 
This study is composed of seven chapters. The current chapter (introduction) is followed 
by a literature review (Chapter 2) about decentralization of water management in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and elsewhere. The studies reviewed in Chapter 2 help to identify the 
main challenges of implementing IWRM in Africa. Among them, the most relevant are 
the lack of clarity in terms of power relations; the insufficient financial sustainability of 
the managing agencies; the lack of knowledge and skills available to manage water at the 
various institutional and geographical scales; the conflicts raised as a consequence of 
increased decision-making power given to local actors with colliding interests; the 
unclear role of the state; the difficult public-private relations; the lack of reliable data and 
information; and the cultural impediments.   
Chapter 3 describes the analytical framework used both in the case studies and in 
the quantitative analysis. Chapter 4 compares the results obtained in the three case studies 
and draws the status of the decentralization process and performance in the studied 
catchments. Chapter 5 presents the empirical models used to analyze the determinants of 
the river basin management decentralization process and performance. Different 
measures of decentralization process and performance are described, including the 
description of key variables affecting the decentralization process and performance, as 
well as their expected direction. Chapter 6 presents the results of the quantitative 
analysis, and Chapter 7 compares the results from the two approaches (qualitative vs. 
quantitative) and draws conclusions and policy recommendations.  
2. Water decentralization experiences: A literature review 
2.1 Background 
Although the concept of decentralization has been attempted and practiced over decades, 
its application to water resources, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, is contemporaneous 
and unprecedented. Water management decentralization reforms, based on the principles 
of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) were characterized by several 
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aspects. They established catchment and sub-catchment organizations, adding another 
layer of institutions to those dating back to the pre-independence or to the immediately 
post-independence frameworks. The reforms were presumed to redress problems of 
inequitable access, high pollution levels, seasonal scarcity, and ever-increasing conflicts. 
Such conflicts had bedeviled the water sector, as well as delivering water and livelihoods 
for the people, especially the poor, through incorporating them into the decision-making 
process.  
Studies elsewhere show decentralization endeavors to be successful in some cases 
while unsuccessful in others. Dinar et al. (2005) recommend decentralization of water 
management by arguing that when decision-making is centralized and local conditions 
are not appropriately taken into account, then accountability of decision-makers is weak, 
and water resource management is inadequate. Empirical evidence from river basins in 
the developed and developing world shows that decentralization of water management 
has led to tremendous achievements in conflict and pollution reduction, productive and 
allocative efficiency, and environmental sustainability (Blomquist, Calbick, and Dinar 
2005; Blomquist et al. 2005a; 2005b; Blomquist, Tonderski, and Dinar 2005; Dinar et al. 
2005).  
However, Stalgren (2006) argues that political entrepreneurs at the national level 
strategically position themselves by influencing the “construction of reality” in matters of 
water governance decentralization at the local level to their advantage. Smith (1983) and 
Fesler (1968) also point out that decentralization promotes parochial and separatist 
tendencies and may deepen enclaves of authoritarianism as well as exacerbate 
inequalities. Kambudzi (1997) states that democratization of water may go beyond our 
intention and turnout to be a recipe for further disaster.   
In most Sub-Saharan African countries the level of awareness to the national 
reforms, as a starting point, differ significantly from country to country, catchment to 
catchment, sub-catchment to sub-catchment, and from locality to locality. Operations and 
effectiveness of the resultant institutional arrangements remain heterogeneous, even 
within the same national boundaries, in which laws and statutory arrangements governing 
the process are almost homogeneous. This fact suggests that the decentralization process 
appears not to be a linear and steady process in these countries. However, a thorough 
analysis of the factors that contribute to the success and failure of the water management 
decentralization process in these countries has not yet been conducted. 
2.2 IWRM, decentralization, and African water policies 
At the heart of most of the water reforms that were implemented in Africa from the early 
1990s is the concept of integrated water resource management (IWRM) (ICWE 1992). 
This concept is defined as “equitable access to and sustainable use of water resources by 
all stakeholders at catchment, regional, and international levels, while maintaining the 
characteristics and integrity of water resources at the catchment scale within agreed 
limits” (Pollard 2002, p. 943). The IWRM encapsulates each of the four Dublin 
Principles as follows (Swatuk 2005):  
1. Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development, and the environments; 
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2. Water development and management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners, and policy makers at all levels;  
3. Women play a central part in the provision, management, and safeguarding of 
water;  
4. Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized 
as an economic good.  
Among these four principles, stakeholders’ participation is the one calling for the 
definition of river basin management at the lowest appropriate level. This refers to the 
idea of decentralization of water policies implementation. In other terms, following the 
subsidiary principle, the design and implementation of water management and allocation 
policies are transferred from the state to local institutions, which are supposed to have a 
better knowledge of the catchment functioning and where representatives of local water 
stakeholders are able to negotiate and decide jointly water management strategies and 
measures to be put in place. It is what Ostrom (1990) calls collective action in the 
management of common pool resources through the design by stakeholders themselves of 
the rules governing those resources. 
At the same time, the Dublin Statement of 1992 demands a holistic approach to 
management of water resources, linking social and economic development with 
protection of natural ecosystems and also linking land and water uses across an entire 
catchment area of groundwater aquifer.  According to Mody (2004, p. 8), “this holistic 
approach thus entails greater integration and centralized decision-making in certain 
dimensions, while competition for resources makes feasible and increases the desirability 
of decentralization and stakeholder participation.” 
In other terms, while centralization in the river helps achieve coordination of 
infrastructure, human resource development and the setting of general priorities for water 
allocation, water quality, and land use, decentralization can achieve efficiency gains 
through more effective delivery of services to users, and also through more prudent use 
of local resources and initiatives.  
In terms of economic efficiency and institutional effectiveness of the water 
governance set-up, centralization can take advantage of economies of scale, internalize 
externalities and manage the hydrological interconnectedness, but it suffers from the 
disadvantage of bureaucratic cumbersomeness and slow response. Decentralization on the 
other side risks the danger of raising transaction costs and requires the pre-establishment 
of a property right system on the resources (Mody 2004, p. 10). 
Mody (2004, p. 12) concludes that there is no generic recipe for the identification 
of the lowest appropriate level of management in a river basin. This appropriate level can 
correspond to the river basin authority that offers participation, or it may be a water user 
association that monitors, operates, and manages a small-scale irrigation system.  
African states, and particularly those of the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) region, are primarily “a collection of economically weak, primary 
commodity exporting, debt-distressed countries with unconsolidated democracies” 
(Swatuk 2005, p. 877).  This fact has important consequences on the budgets and human 
resources capacities that SADC countries in Africa can put in place in order to implement 
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in practice the IWRM principles that underpin their water policies. Two exceptions in the 
region are represented according to Swatuk (2005) by water reforms in South Africa and 
Namibia.  
According to Swatuk (2004), the main difficulties in the implementation of 
IWRM policies in the SADC countries can be identified by the following aspects: 
institutions, due to the institutional inertia that pushes towards maintaining and adapting 
existing institutions rather than creating new (decentralized) ones proposed by IWRM; 
finance, due to the troubles in finding economic resources and the dependence on foreign 
donors; conflict resolution, due to the significant intra-basin (and, to a smaller extent in 
the region, inter-basin) competition for use of the limited water resource; and 
information, due to the lack of reliable and valid data and information about the state of 
the resource.  
Van der Zaag (2004), quoted by Swatuk (2005 p.878), suggested during the 
opening session of a SADC meeting that “perhaps the creation of wholly new institutions 
for water resources management was a mistake. Rather, the new institutions might be 
more effective if they were endowed with advisory powers only, and that more effort 
should be made to introduce IWRM practices into existing bureaucratic forms and 
procedures.” 
The particular and disadvantaged situation represented by most African countries 
requires a specific approach with regard to the implementation of the concept of IWRM 
through water policies, and especially when it comes to decentralization. The complex, 
expensive, and non-linear nature of decentralization, combined with the difficult 
socioeconomic and institutional conditions of African countries, seem to create dubious 
pre-conditions for the introduction of a suitable environment for decentralization policies. 
The following section provides an overview of African experiences in terms of 
implementation of policies directed towards IWRM and decentralization. 
2.3 Success and failure stories from Africa, with focus on SADC countries 
It seems useful to look into concrete examples of recent water policy implementation in 
Africa and observe the assessments that authors have for these institutional dynamics, in 
light of the problems raised in the previous section.  
Following Swatuk (2005) who uses South Africa and Namibia as two positive 
exceptions in the region, we will start our overview from these two countries and will 
proceed towards Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Mali, and Burkina Faso.  
Brown (2010) explored the institutionalization of participatory water resource 
management in post-apartheid South Africa, analyzing the situation in one of the two 
(out of the nineteen originally foreseen) catchment management agencies (CMAs) 
currently fully operational in South Africa, the Incomati CMA. The author argues that 
participation in natural resource management, often coupled with moves for more local 
ownership of decision-making, is based, among other things, on assumptions about the 
role of the state and the transformation potential of institutional reforms. Brown (2010) 
concludes that, after empirical research in the Incomati water management area, there 
might be fundamental weaknesses in the participatory model and the underlying 
assumptions. The implemented approaches of decentralization may actually reinforce 
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inequitable outcomes rather than achieving equity, efficiency, and sustainability in the 
use of water and other resources.  
Brown (2010, p. 183) advocates in South Africa, as in all transitional countries, a 
reassessment of the role of the state, which should be reinforced, as it moves toward 
participatory governance to not render traditional hierarchical government intervention 
obsolete, but overall because a “laissez faire” approach to water participation and 
decentralization by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) in Pretoria 
could have provided opportunities for existing powerful water users and vocal groups to 
co-opt processes and dominate the new organs of governance of CMAs and water users 
associations (WUAs).  
Hossain and Helao (2008) presented some experiences from Northern Namibia 
and shed light on how the management and distribution of water resources have changed 
in independent Namibia, within the background of the government’s decentralization 
efforts. The authors observe that Namibia continues to suffer from acute water shortage, 
recognizing that decentralization is not a monolithic concept, neither is it inherently 
positive or negative. They conclude that there is very little evidence that the liberal and 
commercial approach adopted by the Namibian government towards water resource 
management resulted in policies that are more responsive to the poor or indeed to citizens 
generally.  According to Hossain and Helao (2008), local governments are familiar with 
local circumstances, therefore, they may be in the best position to more equitably 
distribute public resources and target poverty within their own jurisdictions. However, 
redistribution issues from richer to poorer areas must be the responsibility of central 
governments. In this statement, the authors agree with the thesis of Brown (2010) in 
terms of the role of the state. A reason for concern, according to Hossain and Helao 
(2008), is represented by the importance that private interests have in the public decision-
making process: “By promoting participatory good governance, grassroots-based local 
government institutions like the Oshikuku village council can ensure public trust much 
more easily than the private corporations” (Hossain and Helao 2008, p. 210). 
Botswana is a Southern African country regarded by many authors as a “success 
story” because of nearly four decades of unabated economic growth, multi-party 
democracy, conservative decision-making, and low levels of corruption (Swatuk and 
Rahm 2004). The country faces increasingly high water scarcity, due to the dramatic rise 
in water use of water resources. Local policy makers recognized that water supply is 
limited in this arid/semi-arid country and took deliberate steps to manage water demand. 
Botswana then devised a national water master plan (NWMP) and undertook a series of 
institutional and legal reforms throughout the 1990s so as to make water resource use 
more equitable, efficient, and sustainable (Swatuk and Rahm 2004).  
In other words, IWRM once again drove the design and implementation of 
Botswana’s water policy. But according to the authors, policy measures have had limited 
impact on the practice, due to a number of socioeconomic and political challenges, 
identified in: the character and pace of development (focus on infrastructure 
development in support of jobs with negative consequences, and externalities on the 
environment and on the use of natural resources); institutional overlap (too many actors 
decide about water management, with little coordination from the government); cultural 
impediments (no general belief that water will run out and a sense that “government will 
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provide”); human resource capacity (lack of data, information, and expertise); Power 
relations (the continuing preference for new supply, despite stated support for demand 
management, reflects the tension between international and national networks of power).  
Swatuk and Rahm (2004, p. 1363) conclude that the current surplus capital 
reinforces the belief that water can be acquired “somewhere”: alternatively, technology 
will provide, and then “somewhat ironically, this wealth inhibits rather than fosters 
sustainable water resource management.”  
According to Mapedza and Geheb (2010), Zimbabwe emerged as a country with 
one of the most progressive (on paper, at least) water reform processes within the 
Southern African region. Decentralization was certainly a milestone of the water reform 
in the country. The 1998 Water Act set up a decentralized water management structure, 
based on seven catchment councils. More than a decade after, the authors state that water 
reform in Zimbabwe was not simply a technical process, but “it is clearly linked to issues 
of power, political connectedness, and gender, with fewer women benefitting from the 
largely violent fast track land reform process” (Mapedza and Geheb 2010, p. 525).  
Similar to the arguments quoted above by Brown (2010) about South Africa, and 
by Hossain and Helao (2008) about Namibia, Mapedza and Geheb (2010) state that 
“Zimbabwe’s water reform has negatively impacted the livelihoods of the poor, whose 
position is weakened by a lack of resources…. …How the reform played it out in 
Zimbabwe is a function of unequal power dynamics amongst the stakeholders 
…mechanisms should pro-actively be put in place to tilt the power asymmetries in favor 
of the poor people in Zimbabwe, who largely rely on informal and multiple water 
uses…” (Mapedza and Geheb 2010, p. 525). 
Dungumaro and Madulu (2003) make reference to three experiences from 
irrigation projects in Tanzania, leading to very different outcomes to stress the 
importance of community involvement and participation into any developmental 
initiatives, including water-related projects.  
In 2006, the government of Tanzania launched a national program to meet, by the 
year 2015, the water sector targets set out in the Millennium Development Goals. 
According to Giné and Perez-Fouguet (2008), there is evidence that the government is 
promoting more sustained facilities, focusing on cost recovery and on “decentralization 
by devolution.” But shortcomings exist, due principally to a number of factors 
determining non-sustainability of the program. According to the authors, 
“decentralization to the lowest appropriate level is usually interpreted as the need for 
local communities to assume responsibility for their water supply, while little attention 
has been given to define responsibilities of sector-related institutions, nor to methods for 
tracking their performance” (Giné and Perez-Fouguet 2008, p. 18). For the authors, the 
main challenge is identifiable in the management of the systems and in their financial 
sustainability, once installed. Operation and maintenance costs should then be covered by 
water users. Other important challenges hindering the performance of water 
decentralization in Tanzania are identified in the need for additional external funding, the 
lack of strategic vision by local authorities, the lack of skills, the crucial need for 
technical support, and the lack of a supervision and monitoring system.  
In the field of urban and peri-urban domestic water supply, Matsinhe et al. (2008) 
 15 
looked at the possible synergies derived from the public-private partnership in the 
provision of water services in Maputo, Mozambique. The authors present the critical 
situation of the Mozambican capital in terms of water service provision (only 40% of 
households have an indwelling water source), while 38% of the population is served by 
small-scale independent providers (SSIP). To secure and improve water service provision 
to the poorest and most disadvantaged households of the city, the authors advocate the 
legalization of SSIP and the decentralization of certain regulatory functions from the 
central regulatory body (CRA – Conselho de Regulação de Aguas) to the neighborhood 
level. The sustainability of peri-urban water services regulation, based on neighborhood 
water committees, requires that CRA and the municipalities formalize a system of 
payments of license and regulatory fees to ensure long-term functioning of institutions 
created for the purpose (Matsinhe et al. 2008).  
Looking at Western African water reforms, the national water law in Mali was 
voted in 2002, and was followed by a national water policy (2006), based on the 
principles of IWRM (WaterAid 2008). Water management in the country is under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water, and decentralization has taken 
place since 2002, when local authorities (collectivités locales) were legally mandated for 
economic, social, and cultural development. In the water sector, the local authorities in 
charge of water management and allocation are the municipalities. The report of 
WaterAid indicates that, although on the technical side the decentralization process 
showed solid advances, financial concerns are still hindering the dynamics proposed in 
the policy. Financial problems and lack of investment funds represent, according to 
WaterAid, the main constraint that seriously risks jeopardizing the whole decentralization 
process (WaterAid 2008). The institutional reform of water policies in Burkina Faso 
took place in three big phases and is closely connected with the IWRM agenda at the 
international scale (Petit and Baron 2009). In 1998, the government adopted the “Water 
Policy and Strategies” policy document. Three years later, in February 2001, a Water 
Framework Law was approved by the parliament. In 2003, an action plan for the 
integrated management of water resources (IWRMAP) was proposed and covers a period 
until 2015. 
Within the IWRMAP, a decentralization process took place and, as in other 
countries of the West African region, encounters serious implementation difficulties. 
Nevertheless, according to the authors, “we can mention concrete achievements, even if 
numerous dysfunctions still remain. For instance, a water agency was created in March 
2007 in the Nakambé Basin, and about 20 local water committees have been created” 
(Petit and Baron 2009, p. 56). The main limits identified by the authors with regard to the 
implementation of the IWRMAP in Burkina Faso include: (a) the gap between design and 
implementation of the water policy; (b) the lack of clarity and the subsequent conflict of 
competences and power in the water sector; and (c) the lack of coordination between the 
national and the local level. This last aspect is particularly relevant for the 
decentralization process, which “is experiencing difficulties of implementation because 
of a lack of delegation of competencies, and because of the limited funds allocated to 




2.4 Some reflections emerging from the literature review 
IWRM is a complex and expensive process, and decentralization is a crucial component 
of IWRM. Sub-Saharan African countries suffer from chronic inefficiencies and gaps 
inherited from their recent past, and do not seem to represent a proper socioeconomic, 
political, and institutional environment for the fast and successful implementation of such 
policies in the water sector.  
Following the IWRM principles and recipes, most African countries reformed 
their water policies starting from the early 1990s, and put much emphasis on 
decentralization processes and the creation of new agencies at the local level for water 
management and governance.  
The experiences illustrated in the previous paragraph show that although progress 
is visible in the field of water policies implementation and decentralization processes, 
many challenges still exist. Substantial differences are observable around African 
countries, but even those nations indicated as good examples in the difficult path toward 
the practical application of IWRM principles in the real life, like South Africa, Namibia 
and Botswana, still face delays and difficulties in the implementation of water policies, 
with particular reference to decentralization.  
The main challenges are represented by the lack of clarity in terms of power 
relations and distribution of competences between central and local institutions, and 
between old and new organizations; the insufficient budgets and the lack of financial 
sustainability of the managing agencies; the lack of knowledge and skills (human 
resources) available to manage water at the various institutional and geographical scales; 
the conflicts raising as a consequence of increased decision-making power given to local 
actors with colliding interests; the unclear role of the state in the more participatory and 
“democratic” arena represented by local water forums, users’ associations and agencies; 
the difficult public-private relations and the issue of delegation/devolution of power to 
private actors for the management of a vital resource; the lack of reliable data and 
information available for a responsible and effective decision-making process; the 
cultural impediments to water pricing for the recovery of investment and O&M 
(operation & maintenance) costs, both for bulk water and for water services.   
As described above, the level of decentralization process is heterogeneous among 
countries and even within the same national boundaries, in which laws and statutory 
arrangements governing the process are almost homogeneous. This fact suggests that the 
decentralization process appears not to be a linear and steady process in these countries. 
This scenario indicates that the decentralization process and performance is affected by 
diversified factors, and an assessment of these factors contributing to the decentralization 
process and performance of water resource management is essential.  
This study applies an institutional framework presented by Dinar et al. (2007); 
Kemper et al. (2007); and Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper (2010) in an early global study 
to appraise the factors contributing to the decentralization process and performance of 
water resource management in African river basins.  
The institutional framework used to analyze the factors behind the successful or 
unsuccessful decentralization process and performance is described in the next chapter. 
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This framework is applied at both the case study (catchment) and the regional levels. We 
introduced several modifications to the original framework in order to address issues 
pertaining to Sub-Saharan Africa.  We will detail these modifications in the following 
chapters. 
3. Analytical framework 
3.1 Theoretical considerations 
Based on previous work, we can set several hypotheses with regards to the trajectory of 
the decentralization process and its performance. We follow the analytical framework 
suggested by Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper (2005 and 2010), and Dinar et al. (2007) that 
uses concepts such as incentives for stakeholders to act (e.g., the government to 
decentralize, the water users and other stakeholders to take on responsibilities) 3 , 
principal-agent relationships (referring to the transparency and enforcement possibilities 
in contractual agreements between the stakeholders to carry out certain functions), 
transaction costs (in terms of time and money to achieve institutional change) as well as 
the level of influence, determined inter alia by the degree of information asymmetry 
between different actors and social groups in the basin and outside the basin. 
In addition to the specific local context of the decentralization process, an 
important issue to be addressed is what to measure and how to measure. Decentralization 
of decision-making is not an aim per se. It is recommended because experience over the 
past decades has shown that when decision-making is centralized and local conditions are 
not taken appropriately into account, then accountability of decision-makers is weak, and 
water resources management is inadequate. Thus, it is necessary to develop indicators to 
(a) define decentralization as a concept, and (b) define and measure changes in water 
resources management outcomes when the institutional arrangements have changed 
(Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper 2007). 
We start with a proposed definition of decentralization, which is based on (a) an 
increase in transparency in decision-making, and (b) a substantial increase in stakeholder 
involvement in decision-making, including measures to accord financial self-sufficiency. 
Acknowledging that each case is different, the baseline used for analysis would be the 
intention to decentralize as expressed by legislation in a certain country, and by the initial 
statement of objectives of the respective organization that is being analyzed. The 
implementation of this intention would then be evaluated by taking into account (a) the 
existing institutional framework, (b) the process, (c) the political economy, and (d) the 
results. Decentralization can be seen as a reform process and, as such, can be affected by 
other processes that take place in parallel. Forces initiating and affecting the 
decentralization process stem from societal structure in the basin and outside the basin: 
some of these forces are the initiation of the process, the interests leading to the reform 
(top-down or bottom-up), and rules governing the initiation and approval of 
organizational change. These are discussed at length in Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper 
(2005).  
Furthermore, the concept of path dependency plays a major role in the process of 
                                                          
3Stakeholders in the basin may include individuals, groups and governments (from local to federal). 
 18 
institutional reform (Saleth and Dinar 2004: 264). Path dependency is an important aspect 
of the decentralization in SSA, due to the nested organizational structures of many river 
basins that are part of a transboundary river basin organization and possibly international 
treaties. The process by which decentralization measures are introduced is expected to 
affect implementation, and thus performance, and therefore needs to be taken into 
account. The costs and benefits encountered by different stakeholders as well as power 
relations between them are also considered as important variables in our analytical 
framework (Saleth and Dinar 2004: Chapter 4). 
3.2 Hypotheses: Analysis of variables 
For the purposes of developing the analytical framework, we assume that “management 
at the lowest appropriate level” usually implies the active involvement of different 
stakeholders, including users, at various levels related to the river basin. Appropriate in 
this context implies that not all stakeholders need to be involved in all decisions and 
management activities, but that this is a flexible concept that would be adapted to each 
river basin, depending on local conditions.  It is important to note that increasing 
stakeholder involvement is not the end of the inquiry, and there are several important 
related questions. If such active involvement of stakeholders is stable, how can it be 
translated into effective resource management and high performance level? What factors 
might we expect to affect the likelihood of stakeholder involvement turning into effective 
basin-level resource management (as distinct from mere stakeholder consultation, or the 
collapse of stakeholder involvement)? If stakeholder involvement is translated into basin-
level management, how can the active involvement and the effective resource 
management be sustained over time and changing conditions? What factors might 
account for the longevity of decentralized arrangements in some cases and their demise in 
others? Guided by these research questions, we identify four sets of variables under the 
major headings (contextual factors and initial conditions, characteristics of the 
decentralization process, characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships 
and capacities, and the internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements) 
with hypotheses about their impact on the process of decentralization of river basin 
management and its performance. Those variables and hypotheses incorporate ideas 
identified in Mody (2004) and Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper (2005). They are used here 
for translating the theory to analytical hypotheses. For each key variable, we develop a 
list of variables that could capture the expected relationship as follows: 
3.2.1 Contextual factors and initial conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that the outcome of 
decentralization is partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the time a 
decentralization initiative is attempted (path dependency).  These initial conditions are 
elements of the economic, political, and social context of the decentralization effort.  
Several variables that could capture such conditions are detailed below. 
Level of economic development of the river basin region measures the ability 
of the basin stakeholders to commit financial and other resources necessary to the 
decentralization process, in addition to central government provision of support for the 
decentralization effort.  The literature on decentralized water resource management 
indicates that successful decentralization must include some degree of financial 
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autonomy (Cerniglia 2003; Musgrave 1997).  Sustaining this financial autonomy often 
depends upon the establishment of some form of water pricing or tariffs, having the users 
obeying such payments, and having the proceeds remain within or return to the basin. 
Thus, decentralizing management to the basin level, developing and maintaining 
the institutional arrangements for basin-level management, and implementing any form 
of financial autonomy imply that some financial resources at the basin level will have to 
be committed to the decentralization effort.  This in turn implies that basins that have a 
level of economic development that can sustain those resource commitments are (all 
other things being equal) more likely to achieve sustainable success in decentralization. 
Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders is an important 
contextual factor in the development and successful implementation of a decentralization 
initiative.  We also refer to the impact of climate change on the variability of water flows 
in the basin as a measure of resource availability.  This variable has interesting and 
complex properties, however.  On the one hand and more obviously, extreme disparities 
in resource endowments among basin stakeholders can imperil decentralization success.  
If some privileged stakeholders may anticipate being worse off, they are unlikely to 
support the decentralization process and may even try to derail it.  And if other 
stakeholders are so destitute as to be unable to bring any resources of their own to the 
decentralization initiative, they may rationally elect not to participate, even though more 
effective resource management would promise to improve their situation in the long run.  
On the other hand and less obviously, some inequality of initial resource endowments 
may facilitate action by enabling some stakeholders to bear the costs of taking a 
leadership role (Blomquist 1988; Ostrom 1990). 
Thus, some inequality of resource endowments is not necessarily lethal to a 
decentralization initiative, and may even facilitate it if better-situated users are willing to 
lead (Dinar 2009).  Extreme inequality, however, may be detrimental or even derail the 
decentralization effort.  The distribution of resource endowments among the basin 
stakeholders is therefore an important contextual variable affecting the prospects for 
successful decentralization.  We hypothesize that the relationship between level of 
inequality of resource endowments and successful decentralization is quadratic, with the 
greatest positive impact at a certain level of inequality and lower or negative impacts at 
both lower and higher levels of inequality of resource endowment distribution. 
3.2.2 Characteristics of the decentralization process 
Certain conditions or characteristics of the decentralization process itself may affect the 
prospects for successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization 
initiative are (a) a devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) an 
acceptance of that authority and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) 
and (b) both occur will depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes 
place. 
Top-down, bottom-up, or mutually desired devolutionare ways of 
characterizing the decentralization initiative:  In some cases, central government 
officials may have undertaken resource management decentralization initiatives in order 
to solve their own problems – e.g., to reduce or eliminate the central government’s 
political accountability for past or current resource policy failures, resolve a budgetary 
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crisis by cutting their financial responsibility for selected domestic policy areas (Simon 
2002), respond to pressure from external support agencies to formulate a decentralization 
initiative as a condition of continued receipt of financial support.  In other cases, it is 
“bottom-up” pressure from the stakeholders that leads to the decentralization (Samad 
2005).  In still other cases, the decision to decentralize resource management to a lower 
and more appropriate level may have been the outcome of a process of mutual discussion 
and agreement between central officials hoping to improve policy outcomes and local 
stakeholders desiring greater autonomy and/or flexibility. All other things being equal, 
we can anticipate that because decentralization initiatives require active basin-level 
stakeholder involvement, they are more likely to be implemented successfully if 
undertaken under the latter (bottom-up) circumstances than under the former (top-down). 
Existing local-level governance arrangements contribute to continuation:  
The literature suggests that decentralization initiatives are more likely to be accompanied 
by active involvement of basin stakeholders if existing community (village, tribe) 
governance institutions and practices are recognized and incorporated in the 
decentralization process.  This observation has a transactions costs explanation, too: the 
costs (primarily in terms of time and effort) to basin stakeholders of relating on familiar 
organizational forms are expected to be smaller than the costs of relating to an additional 
set of organizational arrangements.  In contrast, decentralization initiatives that feature 
central government construction of new sets of basin-level organizations that are largely 
separate from existing and traditional community governance institutions may face higher 
costs in achieving basin stakeholders’ participation, resource commitments, and 
acceptance of decisions as legitimate.  This does not mean that no new institutions will be 
created in order to achieve basin-scale management. In fact, new institutions will often be 
needed to promote communication and integrate decision-making across communities 
within a river basin.  Rather, all other things being equal, decentralization initiatives are 
more likely to succeed in gaining stakeholder acceptance if they are based upon, and 
constructed from, traditional community governance institutions and practices (i.e., take 
account of existing social capital). 
3.2.3 Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central 
government and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be 
expected to affect that success.  Accordingly, our study includes a set of political and 
institutional variables having to do with the respective capacities of the central 
government and the basin-level stakeholders, and with the relationship between them. 
The extent of devolution of responsibilities and decision-making:  A 
decentralization policy initiative announced by a central government may be only 
symbolic, while the central government retains in practice control over all significant 
resource management decisions.  Worse still, a decentralization policy can represent an 
abandonment of central government responsibility for resource management without a 
concomitant establishment of local-level authority.  In better situations, the central 
government transfers degrees of both authority and responsibility for resource 
management to the stakeholders. 
These differences in the extent of actual devolution that occurs can be expected to 
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affect the prospects for successful implementation of the decentralization policy. 
Symbolic or abandonment policies are at best unlikely to improve resource management, 
and at worst will undermine stakeholder willingness to commit and sustain the extent of 
active involvement necessary for successful decentralization.  All other things being 
equal, we would expect to see greater prospects for success increasing with level of 
devolution. 
Local-level experience with self-governance and service provision:  In any 
country, the decentralization of water resource management does not occur in a vacuum.  
The ability of central government officials to strike a balance between supportiveness and 
intrusiveness, and the capacity of basin-level stakeholders to organize and sustain 
institutional arrangements, will in part be a function of their experiences with respect to 
other public services or responsibilities.  The ability of central and local participants to 
perform successfully will depend on the skills and experiences they have developed. 
We would expect that water resource management decentralization initiatives are 
more likely to be implemented successfully for settings in which local participants have 
experience in governing and managing other resources and/or public services (e.g., land 
uses, schooling, transportation).   
Economic, political and social differences among basin users:  In many 
countries, the distribution of political influence will be a function of economic, religious, 
or other social and cultural distinctions.  But even if it were not for the connection 
between these characteristics and political influence, the characteristics themselves can 
affect successful implementation of decentralization initiatives, through their independent 
effects on stakeholder communication, trust, and extent of experience in interdependent 
endeavors.   
Economic, political, and social distinctions among basin-level stakeholders are 
likely to affect the implementation of decentralized resource management efforts.  The 
greater and more contentious these distinctions, all other things being equal, the more 
difficult it will be to develop and sustain basin-scale institutional arrangements for 
governing and managing water resources.   
It is important to add that these are empirical, not prescriptive, observations.  
Central government officials cannot make distinctions among basin-level stakeholders.  
Nor should central government officials selectively apply decentralization policies only 
in relatively homogeneous settings.  
Adequate time for implementation and adaptation: While it is obvious that 
longevity of water resource management arrangements may reflect their success, it may 
be less obvious that their success may depend on their longevity.  Time is needed to 
develop basin-scale institutional arrangements, to experiment with alternatives and 
engage in some trial-and-error learning.  Time is needed for trust-building, so water users 
begin to accept new arrangements and gradually commit to sustaining them.  Time is 
needed also to translate resource management plans into observable and sustained effects 
on resource conditions.   
The relationship between time and success in water resource management is 
complicated.  On the one hand, we have already said that adaptability is important as 
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water users need to be able to modify institutional arrangements in response to changed 
conditions.  On the other hand, patience is important because a new approach that has not 
succeeded can simply erode stakeholders’ willingness to commit their time and effort to 
the next reform.  We may observe a curvilinear relationship, in which successful 
implementation is less likely to be observed among decentralization initiatives that are 
very young, but is more likely at longer periods, but could taper off if central government 
and basin-level arrangements have proved insufficiently adaptable over long periods. 
3.2.4 The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management may also depend 
on features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or by the central 
government.   
Presence of basin-level governance institutions may be a prerequisite for 
successful water resource management.  Sustained and effective participation of 
stakeholders presupposes the existence of arrangements by which stakeholders articulate 
their interests, share information, communicate and bargain, and take collective 
decisions.  Basin-level governance is essential to the ability of water users to operate at 
multiple levels of action, which is a key to sustained successful resource preservation and 
efficient use (Ostrom 1990). 
Basin-level water resource management (in other words, a decentralized system) 
is neither achievable nor sustainable without the establishment and maintenance of basin-
level governance arrangements.  In the case of SSA, we refer also to situations of rivers 
that are international in nature.  Thus having an agreed upon treaty among the various 
riparians would also fall under this category of sub-basin interests. Because the existence 
of governance arrangements is a necessary, not sufficient, condition of successful 
resource management, we should not expect to find success everywhere we find basin-
level governance institutions, but we should expect to find failure everywhere they are 
absent. 
Recognition of sub-basin communities of interest:  The water management 
issues in the basin are viewed differently by the stakeholders that share the resource in 
various parts of the basin, based mainly on the physical conditions and spatial situation of 
each group.  For example, downstream users’ perspectives on water quality differ from 
upstreamers.  Users with access to groundwater have different views of drought exposure 
than surface water users.  Municipal and industrial water users do not perceive the value 
of assured water supply reliability in the same fashion that agricultural water users do 
(Blomquist and Schlager 1999).  Thus, while basin-level governance and management 
arrangements are essential to decentralized water resource management, the ability of 
sub-basin stakeholders to address sub-basin issues may be as important.  In the case of 
SSA, we refer also to situations of rivers that are international in nature.  Thus having an 
agreed-upon treaty among the various riparians would also fall under this category of 
sub-basin interests. 
Level of participation of various groups in basin-level decision-making 
arrangements explains the direction and extent of the decentralization process.  Of course, 
transaction costs of the decentralization process increase, as such assurances are 
institutionalized, since a larger number of stakeholder organizations within the basin will 
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bring greater coordination costs.  All other things being equal, we would expect that 
successful implementation of basin decentralization has a positive relationship with level 
of participation of stakeholders in the process.  However, with a diverse and large 
number of stakeholders, high transaction costs may become a constraint.  Here too, then, 
a hill-shaped relation of this variable to successful decentralization may be expected, 
with the absence of sub-basin organizations and large numbers of sub-basin 
organizations negatively associated with lower success and greater prospects for success 
in between. 
Information sharing and communication:  The importance of information–
more particularly, information symmetry – and opportunities for communication to the 
emergence and maintenance of cooperative decision-making is relatively well 
understood.  In water resource management especially, in which there can be so many 
indicators of water resource conditions and the performance of management efforts, 
forums for information sharing are vital to reducing information asymmetries and 
promoting cooperation. 
Since information will not automatically be perceived the same way by all 
stakeholders, and the implications of information about resource conditions will differ 
among these groups, it is arguably as important that there also be institutionalized or 
other regular forums in which basin stakeholders can communicate.  All other things 
being equal, we expect to find successful decentralized water resource management more 
likely where information sharing and communication among stakeholders are more 
apparent. 
Mechanisms for conflict resolution are needed to prevent disagreements from 
arising.  Resource users can and will disagree about how well their interests are being 
represented and protected, about how well the resource management program is working, 
and whether it is time for a change, about the distribution of benefits and costs, and 
manifold other issues.   
The success and sustainability of decentralized resource management efforts 
therefore also depend on the presence of forums for addressing conflicts.  All other things 
being equal, we would expect successful implementation of decentralized water resource 
management more likely for settings in which forums for conflict resolution exist. 
3.3 The models 
We apply the framework proposed by Dinar et al. (2007) to analyze river basin 
decentralization processes and performance. This approach is appropriate here, since it 
includes various institutional variables and their possible impact on the outcome of the 
decentralization reform. The approach allows for micro-level analysis, given that it is 
capable at analyzing a decentralization process and performance at a single river basin 
level.   
The relationship between river basin decentralization process and institutional 
variables is given as: 
P =g(C, R, I |X)                                                                                                             (3.1) 
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Where P represents a vector of variables indicating the characteristics of the river basin 
decentralization process (such as length of decentralization, number of institutions 
created and dismantled, etc.), C is a vector of variables representing contextual factors 
and initial conditions involved in the reform process (such as river basin GDP and 
revenues), R is a vector of variables representing the characteristics of central 
government/basin-level relationships and capacities (such as the nature of distribution of 
river basin management responsibilities), I is a vector of variables indicating internal 
configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements (such as the organizational 
structure of the basin organization) and X is a vector of other variables associated with 
the specific river basin (such as river basin size, population etc.). 
The relationship between river basin decentralization performance and 
institutional variables is given as: 
S=f(C, P, R, I | X)                                                                                                           (3.2) 
Where S is a vector of river basin decentralization performance indicators and the other 
variables are defined as described above. The analytical institutional economic 
framework described above is used to access qualitatively and quantitatively the 
decentralization process and performance of water resource management. 
4. Case studies in Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe 
In order to analyze the water governance and decentralization process in Sub-Saharan 
river basins, this study selected a sample of three Southern African catchments: Inkomati 
(South African part) in South Africa, Limpopo (Mozambican part) in Mozambique, under 
the responsibility of the ARA-Sul agency, and Mzingwane (the Zimbabwean component 
of the Limpopo river basin) in Zimbabwe. The choice of the three countries for the case 
studies is due to the interest of comparing countries where water laws and policies were 
designed and implemented in the early ‘90s and therefore are affected by the IWRM 
paradigm and particularly by the idea of decentralization of water management. Another 
factor of choice was the geographic proximity of the catchments, which followed the 
hypothesis that diversity in the decentralization process and performances can exist also 
in river catchments situated in the same geographic area. 
4.1 Data collection and analysis 
This study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected, in the 
three studied basins, using a structured questionnaire4. For data collection, this study 
employed a non-random (purposive) sampling, which consists of selecting respondents in 
a deliberative fashion in order to achieve certain objectives (Prinsloo 2008). For instance, 
respondents with the best knowledge and experience in the river basin decentralization 
process were deliberately chosen to answer the questionnaire, since the main objective of 
                                                          
4The questionnaire is composed of five major sections, namely 1) river basin organization identification, 2) 
river basin characteristics, 3) decentralization process, 4) decentralization performance, and 5) basin 
comparisons. The questionnaire used to collect data for the case studies is presented in Mutondo et al. 
(2011). 
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the study is to access the impact of institutional factors on river basin decentralization 
process and its performance. This technique is appropriate for case studies in which a 
small sample composed of key informants is selected from the target population 
(Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2007).  
The target population of the structured questionnaire was identified as the staff 
members of the river basin organizations. In Zimbabwe, the structured questionnaire was 
mainly administrated to the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) officials, 
which lead the Mzingwane catchment council. In South Africa, respondents were 
officials from the Inkomati Catchment Management Agency (CMA) and the Department 
of Water Affairs and Forestry. In Mozambique, respondents were officials of the ARA-
Sul, water user associations, producers’ associations, and government agencies, such as 
the Chokwe Hydraulic Public Enterprise (HICEP), the Baixo Limpopo Irrigation Scheme 
(BLIS), and the National Directorate of Water (DNA). Respondents to the structured or 
to the semi-structured questionnaires either provided factual data or expressed their 
knowledgeable opinion in terms of performance of the basin decentralization process.  
In the addition to the purposive sampling technique, a random sampling was 
applied and it brought very different samples in the three studied catchments: one 
structured questionnaire was filled in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and twenty-seven 
structured questionnaires were filled in Mozambique. In order to collect primary data 
from a sufficiently larger sample, semi-structured questionnaires5 capturing information 
about the decentralization process were administrated to 125 randomly selected water 
users in Zimbabwe. Additionally, twenty non-structured questionnaires were finally 
administered in the Inkomati WMA in South Africa. A detailed explanation of the 
collection methods and questionnaires used, as well as the list of interviewed 
stakeholders in the three case studies is available in Matsinhe et al. (2012); Chiwbwe et 
al. (2012); Musinake et al. (2012); and Mutondo et al. (2011). 
Primary and secondary data collected in the three case studies do not allow a 
statistical quantitative treatment, and this is due to the limited significance of the 
collected data and to the different weight of the three catchments in the final dataset. This 
study uses a comparative analysis method, consisting of a qualitative comparison of the 
collected data with the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter about the impact of 
selected variables on the decentralization process and performance. The results of this 
qualitative process are detailed in the Annex 1. This approach, therefore, does not 
estimate the impact of studied variables on the river basin decentralization process. It 
rather allows describing those variables in the studied river basins and comparing their 
observed likely impact on the decentralization process with the hypotheses made. 
4.2 Historical context of the three studied countries 
Before comparing the results from our analytical framework in the three studied basins, it 
is important to review and compare the historical political setting in the three countries as 
they influence the outcome of decentralization process and performance. After the 
description of the political setting, we compare the development of water laws and 
policies as they are also important factors in the outcome of the decentralization process 
                                                          
5
 The semi-structured questionnaires are presented in Musinake et al. (2012) and Matsinhe et al. (2012). 
 26 
and performance. Finally, we compare the results of the analytical framework and draw 
conclusions for the studied three basins. 
While unified, South Africa reached a status of independent state within the 
British empire in 1902 as a result of the Anglo-Boer War. The instauration of the 
apartheid regime by the Afrikaners with the support of the British crown kept South 
Africa away from democracy until the free elections of 1994, which brought Nelson 
Mandela to power and allowed the formulation, in 1996, of the Constitution. This 
Constitution (known as final, with reference to the “transitional” one, prepared in 1993 
by de Klerk’s National Party and the African National Congress to open the door for the 
democratic elections) included some fundamental rights, among which access to water 
and sanitation represents a crucial component of modern South Africa’s society.  
Mozambique was under the Portuguese colonial rule until 1975, when the Salazar 
fascist regime was forced to abandon the country by the Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique (FRELIMO), headed by Eduardo Mondlane, who died in 1969, and Samora 
Machel, who became the first president of independent Mozambique. Shortly after 
independence, in 1981 a devastating civil war exploded between FRELIMO and the 
Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO), a movement created in the late ‘70s 
as a “guerrilla force” by Ian Smith’s Rhodesia to contrast the Mozambique government, 
which supported United Nations sanctions against the racist rule in Southern Rhodesia. 
Passed under the support of South Africa after 1980, year of the fall of Smith’s regime, 
RENAMO grew rapidly and became a powerful challenger to FRELIMO, which 
responded militarily, starting a bloody and destructive domestic conflict that finally 
ended in 1992 (agreements of Rome) when democratic elections under the supervision of 
the United Nations were prepared for 1994 and determined a FRELIMO convincing 
victory.  
Zimbabwe’s independence dates back to 1980, when Canaan Banana and Robert 
Mugabe, leaders of the national resistance movement ZANU were elected president and 
prime minister, respectively. Historically, the former Southern Rhodesia, so called after 
the South African businessman and politician Cecil Rhodes was part of Zambezia, a 
territory including today’s Zambia (north-eastern Rhodesia) and Zimbabwe. C. Rhodes, 
through its British South African company, established since 1890 treaties with local 
populations and obtained concessions to exploit natural resources in the whole Zambezia 
region and Nyasaland (today’s Malawi). During sixty years, the white British minority 
(about 250,000 people at its apex) ruled over about ten million Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia, taking advantage also of the internal conflicts between the two main ethnic 
groups of natives: the Shona and the Ndebele. In 1963, after the independence of Zambia 
and Malawi, Ian Smith, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, also declared unilaterally 
the independence of the “Republic of Rhodesia.” The United Nations did not recognize 
the state and put sanctions against the racist regime of Smith. Starting from the ‘50s, 
independence movements ZANU (Shona) and ZAPU (Ndebele) started to mobilize in the 
country and, by the end of the ‘60s, a real war exploded against the regime of Ian Smith, 
who was defeated in 1979.  Under the United Kingdom supervision, a transitional 
government prepared the first national free elections, which took place in 1980 and gave 
the power to the ZANU party. 
For the purposes of this work, we can consider the dates corresponding to the 
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advent of a democratic rule in the three studied countries are respectively 1980 (first 
democratic elections) for Zimbabwe, 1992 (end of the civil war) for Mozambique, and 
1994 (first democratic elections) for South Africa. In Mozambique the civil war exploded 
just after the independence (1975) delayed the normalization of the democratic rule until 
1994. 
4.3 Water laws and policies 
During the colonial era, water resources were regulated in the three studied countries by 
the Portuguese legal framework in Mozambique, and by the English and Roman-Dutch 
framework in South Africa (until the end of apartheid) and Zimbabwe. Following these 
legal systems, in South Africa and Zimbabwe water resources were regulated using the 
riparian principle, which states that landowners bordering a water body (riparian owners) 
were entitled to make reasonable use of the water (Musinake et al. 2012). Water rights 
(private) were allocated in perpetuity on the basis of land holding. In Mozambique, 
private property rights on water were also admitted until the end of the colonial rule.  
The advent of a democratic political system in the three countries introduced new 
constitutional rights and rules, among which water had a prominent role. The new 
national water acts date back to 1991 in Mozambique (followed by the national water 
policy in 1995), and to 1998 in South Africa (followed by the national water resource 
strategy in 2004) and Zimbabwe (Musinake et al. 2012; Chibwe et al. 2012; Matsinhe et 
al. 2012).  
The mid-nineties were the years of the global dissemination of the integrated 
water resource management (IWRM) principles, expressed clearly during the 1992 
Dublin International Conference on Water and Environment. Among the IWRM 
principles, stakeholders’ participation is the one calling for river basin management at the 
lowest appropriated level. This refers to the idea of decentralization of water policies 
implementation. Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper (2005) indicate that effective 
decentralization requires devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and 
acceptance of that authority and responsibility by local entities in the basin. In other 
words, following the subsidiary principle, the design and implementation of water 
management and allocation policies are transferred from the state to local institutions.  
The legislators in the three studied countries followed the IWRM and 
decentralization principles in the preparation of the national laws and policies. In 
Mozambique, the first national water law created five regional water administration 
agencies (ARAs). These ARAs were created in order to implement integrated water 
resource management at the river basin level across the country. The five ARAs are 
responsible for the management of the thirteen river basins in the country.  In Zimbabwe, 
the new water act established catchment and sub-catchment councils to manage seven 
major watersheds identified in the country in an attempt to decentralize management of 
water. In South Africa, the 1998 Water Act established nineteen water management areas 
(WMAs). Within each WMA, the law established the progressive creation of catchment 
management agencies (CMAs), sub-catchments entities (Catchment Management 
Committees – CMCs) and water user associations (WUAs). 
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4.4 Comparative analysis of the basin case studies 
While the detailed results presented in Annex 1 originate from a limited and not uniform 
sample, and the data collection and processing suffered from gaps and missing 
information, the collected material in the three studied water management areas is rich 
and allows a comparison among the different cases. 
For the reasons mentioned above, this comparison can only have a pure 
descriptive value, not being based on sufficiently sound statistical ground. The following 
exercise is therefore an attempt to summarize and sort the information collected and 
described in Annex 1 by comparing the observed results of the survey conducted in the 
three countries with the hypotheses made in the literature (Dinar et al. 2007) about the 
possible impact of the analyzed factors on the decentralization process and performance.  
In Table 1, the four groups of variables included in the analytical framework are 
presented, and their possible impact on the decentralization process of the three studied 
water management areas is indicated. The positive, negative, or contrasted impact that 
can be assumed for each variable is the result of the observed situation in the field, 
compared with the hypotheses made by Dinar et al. (2007). 
In terms of contextual factors and initial conditions, the level of economic 
development in the country and in the catchment at the moment when decentralization 
started was very low in Zimbabwe (degradation of the economic system) and 
Mozambique (aftermath of the civil war), while a growing economy and an increasing 
interest from external donors made the situation in South Africa better off. The studied 
variables indicated for all three basins critical situations regarding the distribution of 
water resources among local stakeholders. Distribution of access was indicated as very 
skewed in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and generally resulting in very poor access in 
Mozambique. Authors of the case studies interpreted this situation as potentially negative 
for the decentralization process and performance, as inequalities and poor initial 
endowment were seen as a factor of exclusion of disadvantaged stakeholders from the 
process. The level of managerial skills by local stakeholders was seen as sufficient in 
Zimbabwe, while in South Africa it was only developed after the implementation of the 
ICMA, and in Mozambique it is low.   
With regard to the characteristics of the decentralization process, the type of 
devolution of the decentralization process was seen as very top-down in Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique, where the process is mainly a shift of the state power to state agencies 
(ZIMWA and ARA-Sul) depending on the respective ministries, and more mutually 
desired process in South Africa, where efforts to involve local stakeholders and make 
them part of the process from the beginning are more evident. The efforts in South Africa 
result in a more diversified composition of the catchment boards and in a more active 
participation by local representatives. Particularly evident in Zimbabwe was the gender 
issue represented by a limited access to managerial position by women. This situation 
was not reported at the same level of importance in the remaining two case studies. 
In terms of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities, the 
studied factors indicate that the devolution of power (particularly at the financial level) is 
still relatively low in the three observed catchments.  The source of the river basin budget 
is the state in South Africa (no data available for Mozambique); while in Zimbabwe it 
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comes from stakeholders’ tariff payments. The first two cases show a lack of financial 
autonomy by the river basin organization, while in the case of Zimbabwe the majority of 
river basin resources are from river basin stakeholders which might guarantee financial 
sustainability over time. However, the low contribution from the government might 
indicate a lack of government commitment in the decentralization initiative. An important 
share of the water tariffs collected from the local users remain in the basin in Zimbabwe, 
where 75% of the collected tariffs stay locally, but only 1% go to stakeholders 
institutions, while the remaining part is for ZINWA. Conversely, in South Africa and 
Mozambique none of the collected water tariffs remain in the basin.  The level of 
management authority given to basin stakeholders is still very low in Mozambique, while 
no data was available for South Africa. In Zimbabwe the establishment of the Mzingwane 
catchment council and the abolishment of the water right system for the renewable water 
permits allocated locally were seen as a step toward devolution of management authority 
to locals.   
Finally, in terms of configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements, the 
presence of basin-level governance institutions and a well-structured hierarchy of 
managing organizations can be seen as a potentially positive factor for water 
decentralization process and performance in the three case studies.  Information sharing 
is a key factor for the success of decentralization processes, as it reduces asymmetries 
among stakeholders and fosters cooperation. In the three studied catchments, efforts to 
establish forums and supports for information dissemination and sharing have been 
observed. In Zimbabwe, the use of English and Western protocols and practices during 
council meetings marginalize disadvantaged community representatives. Similar results 
have been observed in South Africa, where disadvantaged stakeholders do not participate 
actively in council meetings. Forums for conflict resolutions exist in the Inkomati (water 
tribunals) and in the Mzingwane, but according to case study authors, only the water 
tribunals have effectively been active to solve conflicts. In the Mozambican portion of the 
Limpopo, the basin committee works like a forum to hear disputes, but without authority 
to solve them. 
Table 2 contrasts the interpretation by the respondents of the decentralization 
performance in the three catchments. As for the previous results, these comparisons 
must be taken with all precautions as they come from individual perceptions from a 
limited sample of interviewees. 
In terms of the level of accomplishment of river basin objectives, in the 
Mzingwane basin respondents indicated that while water conflict problems were mostly 
solved, water allocation still remains a main issue. Similarly, in the Inkomati catchment 
the objectives to reduce water conflicts, water scarcity, and to improve water quality were 
partially reached. In Mozambique, while primary data for this aspect were not available, 
the case study’s author pointed out that the main catchment objectives are still far from 
being reached. In terms of the state of issues related to river basin stressed resources after 
decentralization, while in Zimbabwe some problems (water scarcity and water conflicts) 
were considered less important after decentralization, other problems (river ecology and 
land degradation) worsened after the decentralization process. In South Africa, with the 
exception of water availability and water conflicts, both reduced, all other problems are 
considered at the same level of acuity as before the process started. In Mozambique, 
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respondents consider that the severe conditions of water resources before decentralization 
did not improve after the process was implemented. Finally, respondents from all 
catchments consider as a positive performance the introduction of renewable water 
permits allocated by the local authority in substitution of the permanent water rights that 
prevailed before the decentralization process. 
4.5 Limitations of the case studies 
The comparison of data collected from the three catchments studied allowed the 
formulation of interesting hypotheses on the possible impact that the observed factors can 
have on both decentralization processes and performances. The interviewees’ points of 
view made it also possible to compare their visions in terms of real performance in the 
three catchments.  
The results presented must be considered with the highest precaution for the 
methodological caveats indicated above, and for the limited sample of the survey. The 
outcomes of the three case studies were verified, and the hypotheses produced were 
tested during the second phase of the project, when a continent-wide survey was 
conducted in Africa using the same structured questionnaire, but adapted to the African 
context on the basis of the experiences in the three case studies. The continent-wide 
survey is described in the following two chapters. The detail on major basins and basin 
organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries is presented in Annex 2.  The data 
collected from the survey were processed using econometric models, based on the same 
analytical framework mobilized for these case studies. The results we got from the three 
case studies are compared with the African survey and conclusions are drawn in Chapter 
7.  
5. Quantitative analysis: Empirical models and data collection process 
5.1 The empirical models 
We apply empirically the analytical institutional economic framework described in 
Chapter 3 and presented through equations 3.1 and 3.2.  The empirical approach taken in 
this chapter builds on and extends the framework used by Dinar et al. (2007) to address 
new developments and experiences in SSA basins, to introduce situations common in 
SSA basins, and to account for likely climate change impacts believed to affect 
decentralization considerations and performance in SSA.  
As indicated in equation 5.1 and 5.2 below, we postulate that the characteristics of 
the decentralization process (P)6 and the level of the decentralization success/progress (S) 
can be estimated using a set of variables that include: contextual factors and initial 
conditions; characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities; 
internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements; and a set of “other” 
variables, identified as necessary.  These groups of variables and their relationships were 
discussed in Chapter 3 and in Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper (2010), and Dinar et al. 
(2007), and will be used in this chapter as well.  In addition, we use two new variables 
that have not been explicitly used in Dinar et al. (2007).  One variable indicates whether 
or not the basin in question is governed by an international river basin organization, 
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 Variables represented by a bold letter indicate a vector. 
 31 
under an international treaty.  International river basin organizations may include many 
tributary basins, all constitute the international basin. The second variable measures the 
likely impact of climate change on precipitation or runoff in the river basin.   
The first equation (equation 5.1 below) explains a certain phenomenon in the 
basin, such as specifics of the decentralization process, measured by the levels of P.  The 
second equation (equation 5.2 below) explains the level of success/progress of the 
decentralization process, measured by S.   
The set of equations used in the estimation of the first relationship takes the 
following shape: 
P =g(C, R, I | V, B, X)                                                                                                    (5.1) 
where: 
P  is a vector of characteristics of the decentralization process; 
C  is a vector of contextual factors and initial conditions; 
R is a vector of characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and 
capacities; 
I is a vector of internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements; 
V  represents the climatic conditions (precipitation or runoff) in the basin; 
B  is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the basin is governed under an 
international river basin treaty/organization; and 
X  is a vector of ‘other’ variables, identified as necessary. 
A general relationship for decentralization success/progress, is given as follows: 
S=f(C, P, R, I | V, B, X)                                                                                                  (5.2) 
where S is a vector of performance indicators of the decentralization in the river basin.  
All other variables are as defined earlier.  
We have several measures of success and several measures of the decentralization 
process.  One possible way to measure success is by using a dichotomous variable that 
takes the value 1 when decentralization was initiated and 0 when no decentralization took 
place, in spite of government intent. A second way of describing success is to measure 
normatively the extent of achieving several important original goals of the 
decentralization reform.  The success variable was computed as an aggregation of the 
success ratings over the different reported decentralization objectives because the KMO-
statistic7 of some individual success objective variables was very low. A third way of 
measuring progress of decentralization is by comparing performance between present and 
                                                          
7
 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic, predicts if data are likely to factor well, based on correlation and 
partial correlation. The KMO overall statistic is used to decide whether or not to include a variable in the 
PC analysis. KMO overall should be .60 or higher to proceed with factor analysis. Variables with KMO 
statistic lower than 0.60 should be dropped from the PC analysis. 
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the pre-decentralization period.  Performance variables may include: level of 
participation, local responsibility, financial performance, and economic activity.  By 
comparing before and after values, we are just comparing change levels of each of the 
variables included in the comparison of before and after decentralization. 
The first specification explains whether or not a decentralization process was 
initiated (equation 5.1).  We expect that it takes some level of the contextual factors (C), 
as well as characteristics of the central government/basin-level relationships and 
capacities (R) to initiate the decentralization.  However, we are not sure about the 
direction of the impact of various internal configurations of basin-level institutional 
arrangements (I).  Some existing water user associations may work in opposite directions.  
We expect that harsh climatic conditions (V) will be associated with higher likelihood of 
establishing river basin organizations and existing international treaties or international 
river basin organizations (B) that overrules the basin will help also in establishing the 
domestic RBO.  We actually had to use the linear probability model (LPM) approach 
because of the small number of observations. LPM is not bounded between zero and one, 
and captures the intensity of the relationship between the dependent and the independent 
variables. 
Several variables could help shed light on the decentralization process.  Few are 
probably of special interest, as they contrast observations across river basin 
decentralization processes under a variety of situations 8 . The length of the 
decentralization process, YrsDecentralization, the transaction costs of the process, 
measured by several variables such as Institutional Dismantled, PoliticalCost, and the 
level of involvement of the stakeholders, WUA Involvement, are a few that caught our 
attention.  Estimation procedures explaining Intuitional Dismantled, Political Cost, and 
YrsDecentralization use an OLS procedure as values of these variables are dummies or 
continuous.  Table 3 summarizes the various equations we specified for relationship 1 
(equation 5.1), and the hypothesized directions of impact of the independent variables, 
based on the theory developed in Chapter 3. 
We identified several variables that serve to measure decentralization success or 
progress.  The estimates of relationships using the first two approaches (that have been 
mentioned earlier) to measuring success/progress imply LPM, TOBIT and OLS 
estimation procedures. We use the variable Success over Objective (calculated as an 
aggregation of the success over all objectives) to reflect achievement of various goals the 
decentralization process was aimed to achieve.  We applied LPM, TOBIT and OLS 
procedure to estimate that relationship as well.  Because we are not sure that the values 
measured are distributed normally, we cannot use GLM as it may provide biased 
estimates.  Thus we use the TOBIT procedure that assumes a Poisson distribution.  
Finally, we construct the additional variable, Problems After, to explain the 
performance of the decentralization process. Problems Before and Problems After are 2 
variables for which we did use Principal Component.  Table 4 summarizes the estimation 
procedures of the various equations we specified for estimating relationship 2 (equation 
5.2), and the hypothesized directions of impact, based on the theory developed in Chapter 
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3. 
5.2 Data collection process 
A survey instrument in Dinar et al. (2005) was modified to collect the data needed for 
estimating the model equations in Sub-Saharan Africa described above. It was first pre-
tested on three river basin organizations (RBOs)9 prior to being modified, translated from 
English to French and Portuguese, and sent to the identified offices of the river basin 
organizations in the various states. The English version of the survey instrument is 
presented in Annex 4. A total of twenty-seven RBOs in SSA known to have undergone 
decentralization to various extents are included in the final dataset we analyze.  
Data collection was undertaken by PEGASYS, a consulting firm in South Africa 
with widely established contacts with water sector agencies in SSA countries. Data 
collection was completed after several iterative processes of data entry and quality 
assurance reviews by the authors. Additional rudimentary statistical tests were 
undertaken to identify, verify, and correct outliers in the dataset. The questionnaires were 
filled by staff from the basin organizations. All questions, especially those related to 
performance of the decentralization reform, required objective rather than subjective 
answers. We intentionally approached local authorities following the reasoning suggested 
by Alderman (2002), who observed that local authorities appear to have access to 
information that is not easily captured in official census datasets.   
5.2.1 The potential final set of basins included in the study 
The basis for the identification of the potential river basin organizations (RBOs) in SSA 
was ANBO, AMCOW and GTZ (2012), which identifies ninety-nine basins in Eastern, 
Western, Southern, and Central Africa (Table 5).   
This list of basins (Table 6) was assessed by PEGASYS and revised, based on a 
set of investigation approaches such as establishing contacts with local NGOs, regional 
agencies, and known water projects.  This process yielded a much more detailed list of 
121 basins and their decentralization status (Table 7).  
As can be seen from Table 7, of the 121 basins, twenty-nine have not started any 
decentralization activity, and the status of decentralization in twenty-six other basins was 
impossible to verify.  This left us with sixty-six basins that went through decentralization 
or that have not yet completed the decentralization process.  
The final sample was composed of twenty-seven RBOs located in six countries 
distributed over two of the four SSA regions (four RBOs in two Eastern Africa region 
countries, and twenty-three RBOs in four Southern Africa region countries).  Since the 
other two regions in the continent, Central Africa and West Africa, do not have 
decentralization experiences or information about it, the respective basin organizations 
were not included in the sample. Our sample is quite representative and balanced, 
representing nearly 30% of the fourteen Eastern basins, and 44% of the twenty-three 
Southern basins that underwent decentralization.  It also suggests that we obtained a 41% 
response rate.  While this response rate is considered barely acceptable in any other place 
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 The river basins where the questionnaire was tested are Inkomoati in South Africa, Limpopo in 
Mozambique, and Mzingwane in Zimbabwe. 
 34 
on earth, it is quite significant in SSA10. A description of the twenty-seven basins, the 
country they belong to, and their status of decentralization are presented in Table 8. The 
list of the twenty-seven RBOs, including their geographical location, can be found in 
Figure 1 and Table 9. 
5.2.2 The administration of the questionnaires 
It is the set of these sixty-six basins to whom questionnaires were distributed. The 
strategy for eliciting responses included: introductory emails followed up by phone calls 
to identify a focal person; shipment of the questionnaire by email; follow-up on progress 
by email, as well as phone; clarification sessions with some respondents about difficult 
questions; review of the received questionnaires and follow-up on particular responses as 
needed; and translation of the questionnaire into an electronic dataset in Excel.  The data 
collection work was planned for six months (March 2012–September 2012), but actually 
lasted much longer (March 2012–September 2013) due to communication difficulties that 
PEGASYS encountered with the respondents. 
5.2.3 Quality assurance procedures 
The electronic dataset was shared with the researchers as it was established over time.  
There were an overall five rounds of feedback from the research team to PEGASYS.  
Feedback included inconsistencies in recording missing values (99999) and 0 values, 
replacement of string values with numerical values, and correction of some basic physical 
information of the basin. Once these inaccuracies had been addressed, the dataset was 
considered complete, even though some variables were not filled.  
In order to increase the response rate, a follow-up survey was sent to the 
respondents if they did not respond to the survey within a month, and then continued by a 
telephone follow-up, if necessary. To ensure the highest possible quality, the research 
team constituted an iterative process of data acquisition and quality assurance reviews.  
The process involved the compilation of qualitative and quantitative data from a 
questionnaire, which the agency that collects the data, PEGASYS, distributed. 
All responses were checked both by PEGASYS and a graduate student at the 
University of California, Riverside (UCR), under the supervision of the principal 
researchers, for errors, which could be critical to the study, such as missing answers to 
questions, which respondents for one reason or another did not or could not answer.  In 
addition to such a check, a further rudimentary statistical test was conducted on most 
variables, to identify outliers within the given response range, and to ensure that values 
are justified.  In all cases, the seemingly errors were brought to the attention of the 
respondents and, in the case of actual errors and/or mistakes, efforts were made toward 
correction. 
5.2.4 Variable construction 
Our questionnaire consisted of fifty-six primary questions, and 245 primary variables (see 
Annexes 3 and 4).  Some of the variables in our data set are naturally correlated to each 
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 Another measure of response rate could be obtained from the ratio of questionnaires that were returned, 
to questionnaires that were sent to potential responding RBOs.  sixty-six questionnaires were sent and 
twenty-seven were filled, which makes the response rate at 41%. 
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other.  We conducted several principal component (PC) analyses in order to capture the 
information in these variables and to prevent possible multicollinearity, by combining a 
set of primary variables into one inclusive PC variable in our estimated relationships. 
Unfortunately, due to the quality of some of the variables in the dataset, the PC analysis 
did not yield meaningful results, and could not be used in our analysis (see footnote 7 
above).  We also used several primary variables to create indices to reflect values that are 
better expressed on a relative rather than on an absolute scale, or to create dummies that 
captured key aspects of the decentralization process. 
6. Results of quantitative analysis 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the quantitative analysis was performed using data 
collected in twenty-seven RBOs. This chapter presents the results of statistical analysis. 
They are split into two subsections: the descriptive statistics, and inference of the 
hypotheses described in analytical and empirical frameworks.  
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
While we based our entire analysis following the structure suggested in Dinar et al. 
(2007), due to the reasons indicated in Chapter 5, we had to revise the measurement of 
some of the variables, and to eliminate several other variables that were not reported due 
to difficulties of the respondents in SSA basins to assign values to them.  This shrunk the 
usable variables, and reduced the overall number of observations that we could include in 
the various estimated models.  A detailed definition of the variables in our dataset can be 
found in Annex 3 (for the variables we created for this analysis). The descriptive statistics 
of the variables that were included in the analysis is presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 demonstrates the problems in filling out the questionnaire as the number 
of variables with full coverage of the entire set of observations fluctuates between ten and 
twenty-seven. Of the available information, some of the descriptive statistics indicates 
that about 40% of the basins were created with a bottom-up approach. In 80% of the 
basins that started the decentralization process, RBOs were created. In 58% of the basins, 
at least one institution was dismantled during the decentralization process. It is also clear 
that disputes over water scarcity seem to be more relevant than disputes over allocation. 
The decentralization process, on average, is about one decade old, ranging between 2 to 
30 years. Decentralization processes in SSA started as early as 1979 and as late as 2009 
(according to our sample). Finally, climate change may be impacting 76% of the basins 
through flow variation, and 68% of the basins in our sample are part of a transboundary 
river, governed by international treaty. 
6.2 Inference of our hypotheses 
Following Dinar et al. (2007), we inferred our hypotheses regarding process and 
performance of the decentralization reform in SSA. Given the few countries in our 
database, we could not include state-level variables, such as wealth, regime, etc. In 





6.2.1 Performance of decentralization (before and after) 
We start by comparing several water management responsibility indicator items before 
and after the decentralization, using a two-tailed t-test.  The results of the analyses of four 
activities (water administration, infrastructure financing, water quality enforcement, and 
setting water quality standards) are presented in Table 11. 
As can be seen in Table 11, more water management activities at higher 
decentralized levels have been reported after the decentralization process, compared with 
the situation before the decentralization. With ranking of water activities varying between 
1 and 5 (with 1 indicating centralized, and 5 indicating most decentralized activity), one 
can see that there was a significant move of responsibilities toward basin level, and a 
significant reduction of responsibility at the central government (increase in local 
responsibility was not significant, and the same is true for increase in state 
responsibility). A significant increase of responsibilities toward basin level was also 
reported in the case of infrastructure financing (increase in responsibility at the local 
level, and decrease in responsibility in the state and central government levels were not 
significant). A significant increase in responsibility for water quality enforcement at the 
basin level was reported (insignificant increase in local responsibility, and insignificant 
decrease in state and central government responsibilities were also reported). A 
significant increase in responsibility at the basin level was reported for setting water 
quality standards (no significant changes have been reported for local, state, and central 
government).  As a whole, our sample RBOs have moved after the decentralization 
process toward more responsibility at the basin level for all four water management 
decision-making activities. At the same time, these RBOs show a reduction in the central 
government responsibility in only water administration and water quality enforcement 
activities.  Compared with Dinar et al. (2007), we introduced in this analysis a category 
of local responsibility (mainly due to the very large size of the basins in SSA, compared 
to many of the basins in the study by Dinar et al. (2007).  However, by 2013, there is still 
no progress toward increased responsibilities to the local communities, which suggests 
difficulty in implementing decentralization toward local actors. 
We were also able to get assessments of the severity levels of several issues the 
basin have been facing, and compare the situation before and after the decentralization. 
The scales used were: (i) Ranking of severity before decentralization, 0: No problem, 1: 
Some problem, 2: Severe problem; (ii) Ranking of severity after decentralization, -1: 
Situation worsen, 0: situation the same, 1: Situation improved.  Means of these 
assessments for each problem item are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 suggests that before decentralization, except for floods (with mean value 
of 0.95), all of the other issues were in the range of “some problem” to a “severe 
problem.” Water conflicts and development issues exhibit the highest level of severity in 
the sample basins.  After decentralization, all six issues have been either stable or 
improving, with floods, land degradation, and development issues being closer to 1, 
indicating that the situation related to these issues tended to improve on average. The 
situation remains on average the same for water scarcity, environmental problems, and 
water conflicts.  
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6.2.2 Determinants of the decentralization process 
We used three decentralization process variables that allowed us to use most of the 
observations in the dataset.  The results of the estimated equations are presented in Table 
13. 
The results in Table 13 indicate very significantly that regardless of the inclusion 
of the international treaty and the flow variation over time, all contextual factors 
included, as well as the variables that measure the internal configuration of basin-level 
institutional arrangements, were significant and follow the expected sign, except the 
Creation Bottom-Up variable.  The coefficient of the Political Cost is positive and highly 
significant, suggesting that a higher political cost increases the water users involvement, 
and may lead to the creation of an RBO as a way to establish the new framework for a 
cooperative use of the resources. The negative sign on the coefficient on Creation 
Bottom-Up, while opposite to our initial expectations and previous findings (Dinar et al. 
2007) is in line with the anecdotal information provided in Chapter 1, and in Mutondo et 
al. (2011), suggesting that the WUAs that have been established in the RBOs were not 
well prepared to take off the decentralization process, lacking organizational, legal, and 
technical skills. This result may indicate that some central government involvement is 
still needed in SSA basins as a way to transfer not only responsibilities, but also skills to 
manage the resources under the decentralized arrangement. This support of the central 
government is needed so that the WUAs creation and implementation process is not 
“manipulated” by dominant groups and, therefore, is neither equitable nor sustainable.  
More generally, this finding suggests that Creation Bottom-Up is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for institutional decentralization.  
Being under an International Treaty improves cooperation and raises the 
likelihood of an RBO being created and institutions dismantled. At this point, it may 
seem that an international treaty that coordinates the various parts of the basin located in 
different countries may serve as a roadmap for a more effective decentralization and a 
support tool for users to take the reins of the water resources management in a more 
stable and accountable setting. 
The variable Disputes over Allocation has negative and significant coefficient in 
the equation explaining WUA Involvement, and a positive and significant coefficient in 
the equation explaining RBO Created. These results follow our expectations. They 
suggest that not having sufficient dispute resolution mechanisms lead on the one hand to 
disengagement of WUAs and, on the other hand, it does provide impetus to the creation 
of the RBO. Indeed having water conflicts before the decentralization was indicated as 
the most severe problem (Table 12). 
Results for several water scarcity variables are worth mentioning. Relative Water 
Scarcity, Share of Surface Water, and Water Flow Fluctuates are significant and have 
positive signs. This suggests that water scarcity in the range observed in our sample leads 
toward more involvement of the WUAs, more likelihood of creation of the RBO, and 




6.2.3 The decentralization performance 
We were somehow limited in our ability to use the data on all variables that are expected 
to measure and explain decentralization performance.  We remained with only two 
variables that measure performance, Success over Objectives and Problems After 
Decentralization. The results of our regression analyses are presented in Table 14. 
Scrutiny of the results suggests that in spite of having a small number of 
observations, our model is of high explanatory level and significance.  All coefficients 
are significant and with the expected sign, except for Water Flow Fluctuates and 
International Treaty, which are not significant. Adjusted R-squared ranges between 0.964 
and 0.998 and F-test values are significant at 1% and less.  The results indicate that 
higher Share of Surface Water, as well as a longer experience with the decentralization 
process (Years Decentralization) enhances the success over the basin's objectives. Lower 
levels of water scarcity, up to a point, may allow for an easier cooperation and 
coordination of the users and for a faster accommodation of the decentralization 
arrangements. In other words, the absence of an acute problem around water availability 
facilitates conditions for coordination and common approach toward basin solutions. A 
longer decentralization process may indicate the possibility of the establishment and 
learning of a cooperative behavior, and the stability of the mechanisms to solve disputes, 
which translate into a higher social capital accumulation. Contrary to the previous table, 
the political cost is highly significant and of a negative sign. It could be entirely possible 
that, as for sharing the benefits of the decentralization process, an excessive level of 
political costs (through the changes of institutions or the imposition of new duties) may 
offset any possible short-term gain. Also, it is not because RBOs are created that 
problems are solved.  
Not like in the equations estimating the decentralization process characteristics, 
here, Creation Bottom-Up has a positive impact on the performance of the 
decentralization.  That a higher-level Governing Body fosters the accomplishment of the 
objectives may be an indication of the need of the higher government levels to be active 
and supportive during the decentralization process. Having a higher Budget per Capita is 
an important factor in having fewer Problems after Decentralization, which is an 
important finding with policy implications.  Some other coefficients deserve additional 
discussion as their coefficients are different in the decentralization process equation 
(Table 13) and in the decentralization performance equations (Table 14), which was 
expected, based on our theoretical framework (Tables 3 and 4). Political Cost has a 
positive sign in the process equations and a negative sign in the performance equation; 
Creation Bottom-Up has a (surprising, but justifiable) negative sign in the process 
equation, and a positive sign in the performance equation; and Years Decentralization has 
a negative sign in the process equation, and a positive sign in the performance equation. 
7. Conclusions and policy implications  
The process of water management decentralization in African countries is seen as a 
means of advancing river basin management at the lowest appropriate level. However, 
there are very different stages of implementing decentralization in practice. This called 
for a research aiming in understanding the following questions: (i) why do some water 
agencies succeed more than others? (ii) what are the variables involved in such reform 
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process? (iii) which variables have a positive or a negative impact on the implementation 
of decentralization processes? (iv) which variables could be affected by policy 
interventions, and how? This study aimed to answer these questions through the 
following objectives: (i) analyze the factors that have potentially affected the results of 
decentralization process in SSA basins, and (ii) analyze the performance of 
decentralization process in SSA basins.  
As described in Chapter 1, these objectives were analyzed by combining 
qualitative analyses through a case study approach in three river basins (Limpopo in 
Mozambique, Inkomati in South Africa, and Mzingwane in Zimbabwe) in the SADC 
region, and quantitative analyses based on the data collected from twenty-seven river 
basin organizations in SSA countries.  
Previous studies on the decentralization process of water management in Africa 
identified different factors that might have been limiting the decentralization of water 
management in SSA countries, such as the lack of clarity in terms of power relations and 
distribution of competences between central and local institutions and between old and 
new organizations, the insufficient financial sustainability of the managing agencies, the 
lack of knowledge and skills available to manage water at the various institutional and 
geographical scales, the conflicts arising from colliding interests, the unclear role of the 
state, the difficult public-private relations, the lack of reliable data and information, and 
cultural impediments.   
Although past studies brought informative results regarding the limiting factors 
toward decentralization of water management in SSA countries, they are limited as they 
used qualitative approaches that did not estimate the directions and the magnitude of 
these factors on decentralization process and performance. To fill this gap, this study 
applied in SSA jointly qualitative and quantitative approaches, following the analytical 
and empirical framework developed and used by Kemper et al. (2007), and Dinar et al. 
(2007) to analyze water management decentralization. This framework described in 
Chapter 3, previously used in several regions of the world but not in Africa, was applied 
both to case studies (phase 1) and to the whole Sub-Saharan Africa (phase 2). Some 
modifications to the original framework were made to capture issues faced by water 
sector in SSA countries, such as the effect of climate change, as well as whether or not 
the basin in question is governed by an international river basin organization. 
Chapter 4 applied the analytical framework described in Chapter 3 to summarize 
and compare the results about decentralization process and performance of water 
management in three river basins of SADC countries. Chapter 5 presents the empirical 
model used for the quantitative analysis in twenty-seven basins in SSA, and Chapter 6 
illustrates the respective results.   
The overall findings and conclusions from the study are presented, and their 
implications to water sector policy are discussed in this chapter.  The conclusions and 
implications are given for the water management decentralization process and 
performance, taking into account the key variables of the analytical framework: (i) 
contextual factors and initial conditions, (ii) characteristics of the decentralization 
process, (iii) characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and 
capacities, and (iv) the internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements.  
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7.1 Decentralization process 
7.1.1 Contextual factors and initial conditions 
Comparing the studied basins, high population density seems to yield pressure on basin 
resources that, in turn, foster the initiation of the decentralization process. This 
hypothesis was tested in the empirical analyses by inclusion of relative water scarcity 
variables in decentralization process models. The quantitative analyses showed that 
Relative Water Scarcity, Share of Surface Water, and Water Flow Fluctuates are 
significant and show a positive sign. This suggests that water scarcity in the range 
observed in our sample leads toward more involvement of the WUAs, more likelihood of 
creation of the RBO, and dismantling of existing institutions in the process of 
decentralization. The course of decentralization process is therefore more likely to be 
successful in settings with high populations, which leads to relative scarcity of water 
resources. 
In terms of the level of economic development, our results showed that a higher 
political cost (a proxy variable for the level of economic development in the empirical 
analysis) increases the water users’ involvement, and may lead to the creation of an RBO 
as a way to establish the new framework for a cooperative use of the resources.  
Additionally, under the performance models, basin budget per capita showed to be 
reducing basin problems after the decentralization process.  The level of economic 
development contributes therefore positively in decentralization process of water 
management. 
Finally, the results of the performance models indicated that the decentralization 
process is more likely to succeed in settings with less skewed distribution of basin 
resources, as basin stakeholders will be equipped with resources that allow them to 
cooperate and interact equally in the management of the basin resources. 
7.1.2 Characteristics of the decentralization process 
Descriptive statistics from the quantitative analyses revealed that decentralization 
processes in SSA countries, on average, are about one decade old, ranging between 2 and 
30 years. Empirical analysis showed that as the number of years increase, the 
involvement of water-user associations in decentralization process decreases. This 
implies that, above a certain threshold, the number of years could contribute negatively to 
the decentralization process, as the stakeholders might be unwilling to continue the 
process if tangible results are not realized.  
In terms of type of devolution of the decentralization process, results from the 
continent-wide study show a negative impact on the decentralization process in basins 
that followed a bottom-up approach.  This is perhaps due to the fact that WUAs that have 
been established were not well prepared to implement the decentralization process, 
lacking organizational, legal, and technical skills. To confirm this fact, the level of 
managerial skills showed to be limited in the three studied SADC river basins. This 
implies the need of government support in terms of transfer of technologies and skills to 
manage water resources in SSA basins. The bottom-up devolution process is therefore a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for institutional decentralization needing support of 
government to transfer responsibilities and technical skills. 
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7.1.3 Central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
The devolution of power to manage basin resources in the three studied SADC basins is 
still relatively low. The source of river basin budget is heavily skewed, being mainly 
from river basin stakeholders in Zimbabwe and from government and donors in South 
Africa and Mozambique. 
Although in the three case studies the results showed a limited devolution of basin 
management activities to the basin level, empirical results in the continent-wide sample 
showed an increase in terms of participation of basin organizations in the management of 
basin management activities.  
7.1.4 The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
The presence of basin-level governance institutions and a well-structured hierarchy of 
managing organizations can be seen as a potentially positive factor for water 
decentralization process and performance in the three SADC case studies. However, the 
power given to organizations located at basin level is limited. Additionally, mechanisms 
for information sharing and forums for conflict resolutions exist, but the participation of 
stakeholders is still limited. Our results from the African-wide survey showed finally that 
the likelihood of an RBO being created increases if the basin belongs to an international 
treaty. 
7.2 Decentralization performance 
In this study, performance was measured by: (i) the RBOs level of success in attaining 
the objectives of decentralization of water management, (ii) the level of devolution of 
activities related to management of water resources, and (iii) the level of problems related 
to river basin stressed resources before and after decentralization process.  
The results of empirical analyses showed that (i) the successes of decentralization process 
is more likely to be attained in the basins with institutional arrangements, following a 
bottom-up process, with uniform share of water resources and upon existence of financial 
resources to fund the process. Regarding (ii), the allocation of basin management 
activities among central, state and local governments as well as basin authorities, the 
decentralization of water management in SSA countries has been implemented with some 
degree of transfer of basin activities from central government to basin organizations. The 
reduction of involvement of central government is significant for the activities related to 
water administration and enforcement of water quality. For (iii), the level of problems 
related to river basin stressed resources before and after decentralization process, 
decentralization of water management in SSA countries is contributing positively in 
reducing the constraints posed by different basin stressed resources. However, many 
problems due to water stress are still present and urgent to approach. 
7.3 Policy implications 
Decentralization efforts in river basins have been seen around the world under various 
political and institutional situations. African river basins have been joining the 
decentralization process of river basins relatively late, initiating the process somewhere in 
early 1990s. After analysis, we conclude that the analytical framework of water 
management decentralization we used is robust enough to explain the decentralization 
process and progress even in the presence of a limited sample. It seems that this 
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framework, when used with a richer dataset and over a longer period of time, can be 
informative to policymakers when designing and evaluating decentralization processes in 
Africa and other parts of the world. 
Some of the variables studied in our quantitative analysis have interesting 
implications. They reveal that the success and stability of the decentralization process 
depends on the way the new framework distributes the Political Cost and compensates 
those who carried its burden. As for the Method of Creation, a grass-roots initiative, 
despite all the benefits it may capture in terms of legitimacy and use of pre-existing 
community arrangements, is insufficient if not properly supported by government 
transfers of skills, or know-how, budget responsibilities, and technical knowledge. The 
similar impact of the variable WUA’s Involvement in the presented model amplifies that 
conclusion. For SSA, this conclusion is probably the most relevant one, with policy 
implications.  Training the WUAs prior to the initiation of the decentralization process is 
essential for a more effective decentralization process. Otherwise the social investment in 
institutional reforms in the water sector would be wasted.  It should be mentioned here 
that the results concerning the variables Method of Creation, Creation Bottom-Up, and 
WUAs Involvement in a previous study with similar analytical framework applied to 
regions other than SSA were the opposite, suggesting that in SSA grass-roots efforts still 
have to be nourished. 
Interpreting the opposite signs of the coefficients of major variables (Creation 
Bottom-Up, Political Cost, Years Decentralization) when they are included in estimates 
of the decentralization process on one hand and performance on the other hand could 
mean that while the implementation of decentralization processes in the water sector in 
SSA does not guarantee success, on the other hand, factors that improve the performance 
of decentralization do not necessarily facilitate its implementation.  For example, in-
progress decentralization institutions can have better results in terms of solving local 
water-related issues than established RBOs suffering from untrained staff and 
malperformance of infrastructure, and being disconnected from the stakeholders. 
It also appears that the best performances of decentralized basins refer to solutions 
of infrastructural problems (floods, and land degradation control), while the socio-
economic problems perceived before decentralization (conflicts, development) have been 
less addressed. This result could be a consequence of the fact that hardware solutions 
(infrastructure, engineering) are easier to implement than software solutions 
(stakeholders’ participation, dispute resolution forums, etc.). Another interpretation of 
this last observation is associated with the previously mentioned context of un-trained 
staff: that infrastructure could be built by international companies, but when completed 
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Annex 1: Application of the analytical framework to the three Southern 
African case studies 
The synthesis presented in Chapter 4 is based on case studies implemented in three water 
catchments of Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. These catchments are the 
Mozambican portion of the Limpopo basins, the Inkomati, and the Mzingwane, 
respectively. Each case study described the characteristics of the catchment and the 
institutional variables, including their impacts on the decentralization process and 
performance (see Matsinhe et al. 2012; Chiwbwe et al. 2012; Musinake et al. 2012). The 
following sections of this annex illustrate in detail the situation in the three studied 
catchments according to the variables that are identified in the analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 3.  
Contextual factors and initial conditions 
Level of economic development of the country and river basin before the decentralization 
initiative:  
In the Mzingwane basin, Musinake (2011) reports that the economic conditions of 
Zimbabwe are not favorable for the development of new institutional arrangements 
capable of implementing successful decentralized and integrated water resource 
management. The author underlines that the level of economic development in the 
catchment and in the country as a whole has been decreasing in the last decade. The 
treasury has been running dry given that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank and other financial institutions had withdrawn their financial support to the 
government. In this respect, the government had started weaning off other responsibilities 
it felt were less strategic. At the same time, stakeholders were handicapped by 
hyperinflation. This situation made it impossible for stakeholders and government to 
invest time and money into knowledge generation, planning, negotiation, adoption, and 
implementation of institutions for river basin management, which have affected 
negatively the decentralization process. 
In the Inkomati River basin of South Africa, in addition to the improved economic 
conditions over the past decade, the CMA has been receiving funds from the government 
and external donors. Especially, the funds received by the Inkomati catchment 
management agency (ICMA) have increased from about 5 million rands in 2006 to about 
30 million rands in 2010. An increase in financial resources allowed the river basin 
agency to have financial capacity to bear transaction costs associated with 
decentralization initiative and ongoing costs that support and facilitate basin scale 
management. 
The Mozambican portion of the Limpopo basin’s GDP seems to be low, since the 
majority of basin stakeholders are smallholder farmers whose revenues from crop 
production are insufficient to cover the costs of water (Matsinhe 2011). Additionally, 
Mozambique had recently experienced a devastating civil war, which resulted in massive 
destruction of productive infrastructures and affected dramatically the economic 
development of the country. For example, between 1981 and 1986, the Mozambican 
GDP reduced by 30% (Howard et al.1998).  
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River basin population density:  
The Mzingwane River basin has nearly 693,000 inhabitants in an area of 63,000 
km2, resulting in a population density of about eleven people per km2.The same is 
observed in the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo (856,000 inhabitants within an area 
of 79,800 km2). On the other hand, the Inkomati River basin has 2.2 million people in an 
area of 28,800 km2, corresponding to a population density of about seventy-seven people 
per km2. Dinar et al. (2007) report that the decentralization process is likely to be fostered 
in the basins with higher population density.  
Stakeholders’ share of river basin resources before the decentralization process: 
Musinake (2011) reports that the multiplicity of ethnicities and other deep socio-
cultural differences among the Mzingwane catchment stakeholders throughout the basin 
has been a great challenge to establish communications and information sharing.  
Difficulties relating to differences in stakeholders’ socio-economic status were increased 
by the type of devolution that followed the decentralization of the Mzingwane River 
basin. A top-down approach was followed in which the government of Zimbabwe solely 
decided to cede some powers to the stakeholders in water resources management by 
crafting two institutional arrangements, namely the Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
(ZINWA) and the Mzingwane Catchment Council. 
In the Inkomati catchment, Chibwe (2011) reports that the distribution of river 
basin resources was highly skewed in favor of the minority of white South African 
citizens as heavy legacy of the apartheid regime, which only ended in 1994. South Africa 
has a Gini coefficient of 0.96, in terms of water use (Van Koppen, Jha, and Merrey 
2002). This statistic reveals a large gap between water use and the equity line, thus 
leaving many people without sufficient water resources for their daily usage. The 
inequality in accessing and using water resources is partly attributed to the poor state of 
some water infrastructure in the Inkomati Water Management Area (IWMA). Finally, 
formerly disadvantaged individuals, particularly in former homelands (Bantustans), 
continue to face significant power imbalances in terms of knowledge and expertise, 
compared to established white commercial farmers and other elite interest groups. There 
are differences between emerging farmers and commercial farmers in the IWMA in terms 
of water use. The commercial farmers, who are better endowed, are considered to be 
using more water than the quantity allocated to them, as they have been pumping water 
during non-pumping hours. In Mozambique, while not mentioning the socio-economic 
gaps of the two previous cases, Matsinhe (2011) reported a generalized low access to 
water resources by the local stakeholders.  
River basin stakeholders’ management capacity: 
In the Mzingwane catchment, capacity building programs were not reported, but 
sufficient human capacity seems to exist. This capacity is demonstrated according to 
Musinake (2011) by the ability of the catchment and sub-catchment councils to prepare 
the outline plan for the basin.  
In the Inkomati catchment area of South Africa, Chibwe (2011) reports that the 
CMA has built its managerial capacity over the period of its existence and it is now able 
to offer services to other CMAs. For example, the Inkomati CMA has produced the 
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catchment management strategy and has been invited by the Breede Overberge (BO) 
CMA to provide input into its drafting of the basin organization catchment management 
strategy.  In Mozambique, according to Matsinhe (2011), the Limpopo basin is just an 
example of the generalized lack of human capacity and resources for water management 
observable all over the country. Similar to South Africa, capacity building was not 
reported in Mzingwane River basin, although the majority of basin population did not 
complete primary school. However, human capacity seems to exist as the basin 
stakeholders were able to prepare the outline of the river basin plan. 
Characteristics of decentralization process 
Length of decentralization process:  
In the Mzingwane River basin, the process has been underway for eleven years, 
since the creation of ZINWA in 2000. The length of time needed to complete a 
decentralization process is difficult to assess, and there is a need for adequate time to 
adjust changes and stabilize the decentralization process (Blomquist, Dinar, and Kemper 
2005). Therefore, the direction of the decentralization process cannot be easily assessed 
using the number of years that Mzingwane River basin has been under decentralization. 
In the Inkomati WMA, according to DWAF (2001), the establishment of the 
Inkomati CMA was initiated in July 1997 by the regional office (RO) of DWAF 
Mpumalanga. On the 30th of March 2004, the Inkomati CMA was officially launched. It 
took almost seven years since the approval of water law in 1998 to establish the ICMA. 
In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo River basin, the decentralization of water 
resource management started with the approval of the Water Law in 1991, which resulted 
in the establishment of the river basin organization (Limpopo River basin management 
unit) in 1993. The decentralization process has been therefore underway for almost 
eighteen years, and it is still an ongoing process. 
Number of institutions created or dismantled during the decentralization process: 
Musinake (2011) reports that decentralization of water management in Zimbabwe 
eliminated and created institutions at central and local levels. Specifically, at the national 
level, the Ministry of Water Resources Management and Rural Development, as well as 
ZINWA, were created while the Department of Water and Development was dismantled. 
At the local level, district offices and structures of Department of Water and 
Development were dismantled, while the Mzingwane catchment and sub-catchments, 
such as Sashe, upper Mzingwane, Lower Mzingwane, and several water-user associations 
were created. Each catchment and sub-catchment is led by a council.  
In South Africa, the decentralization process did not eliminate existing institutions 
at the national level, while it created and eliminated local-level institutions. The Inkomati 
catchment management agency was established, and two irrigation boards were 
converted into water-user associations.  
In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, at the national level, the national 
directorate for water and regional water management agencies were created. At the river 
basin level, the decentralization process has created the Limpopo River basin 
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management unit (UGBL)11, the Chokwe hydraulic public enterprise (HICEP), the Baixo 
Limpopo Irrigation Scheme (BLIS) 12 , the Basin Committee 13  and some water-user 
associations14. However, Matsinhe (2011) reports that the existing water user associations 
are not fully operational. The limited functionality of the water user associations is also 
reflected in the lack of formal inclusion of this type of organization in the management 
structure of the river basin organization.  
Level of involvement of the river basin stakeholders in the decentralization process: 
In the Mzingwane River basin, the only stakeholders who actively participate in 
crafting water laws and creating river basin organizations are government officials and 
politicians. Specifically, Musinake (2011) reports that the government unilaterally made 
the decision to form the ZINWA, and the local stakeholders were never consulted in the 
promulgation of the ZINWA Act of 1998.  
In South Africa, different stakeholders were involved in the development of the 
1998 Water Act, as well as in the creation of river basin organizations. At IWMA, the 
involvement of stakeholders was led by the government through the DWAF regional 
office (RO) in Mpumalanga and the process started in 1997 before the approval of the 
1998 Water Act. The identified stakeholders were either contacted by phone or mail by 
DWAF officials. Each time new stakeholders were identified, they were also contacted 
and motivated to participate in the proposal development process for the establishment of 
the Inkomati CMA.  In order to guarantee the participation of disadvantaged 
stakeholders, DWAF officials traveled to historically disadvantaged communities and 
companies to hold meetings with them. In cases where participants had incurred 
transportation costs, they were reimbursed by the government through the DWAF RO 
(DWAF 2001).  When the 1998 NWA was passed each sub-catchment of the IWMA 
(Komati, Crocodile, Sabie-Sand) developed a sub-catchment proposal. Finally, the three 
proposals were amalgamated in 2000 to form a CMA (Inkomati CMA) proposal that was 
submitted to DWA for consideration and approved in 2001.  These results show strong 
participation by stakeholders in the creation of ICMA and its sub-catchments.  
In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, the creation of river basin 
organizations (ARA-Sul and UGBL) was mainly performed by government officials in 
response to World Bank and other funding agencies recommendations. Matsinhe (2011) 
reports that formal basin management institutions, such as UGBL, HICEP, and BLIS 
were created by the government and, in part, through national laws and decrees. In 
addition, communities have a smaller share of responsibility in the basin management 
issues. 
Participation of stakeholders on decentralization process can also be measured by 
                                                          
11
 UGBL is a river basin organization under the management of ARA-Sul, which is responsible for water 
allocation at the basin level. 
12
 HICEP and BLIS are public enterprises responsible for the management of irrigation schemes in Chokwe 
and Xai-Xai districts, respectively. 
13
 The Basin Committee is a coordinating organ between the entity responsible for water allocation and 
other river basin stakeholders. 
14
 Matsinhe (2011) reports that sixty water-user associations have been created in Limpopo River basin. 
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the composition of sub-catchment councils. Musinake (2011) finds that in all sub-
catchment councils, female representation is less than 40%. Additionally, there is no 
single woman who heads any of the sub-catchment councils. The highest position for a 
woman is the treasurer, which is registered at Upper Mzingwane sub-catchment council.  
The participation of stakeholders in the decentralization process can also be 
demonstrated by the level of involvement of local stakeholders in ZINWA committees. 
Most of the interviewed individuals stated that local stakeholders are not involved in 
ZINWA committees.  
When the Inkomati CMA was formally established in 2004, its capacity was low 
with a lean staff structure and no governing board in place. The board was appointed in 
2006 to oversee the operations of the Inkomati CMA. The governing board of ICMA was 
initially composed of thirteen members, representing different stakeholders15; however, 
during the period of data collection, the board size was ten members only. 
In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, UGBL, HICEP, and BLIS governing 
board members are appointed by the government. And water-user associations governing 
board members are appointed by the local stakeholders, using a voting system. The 
government power at river basin level is also highlighted by the governing body of Basin 
Committee. Matsinhe (2011) reports that the basin committee is chaired by the director of 
the UGBL, a representative of ARA-Sul, which is an organization related to the central 
government. 
The level of stakeholders’ participation in the decentralization process can also be 
measured by the degree of participation of stakeholders in river basin meetings. In 
Mzingwane river basin, 75% of stakeholders have been participating in river basin 
meetings. However, the usage of English language and western protocol has limited the 
participation of stakeholders during basin meetings. 
In the Inkomati catchment, the level of attendance to board and basin meetings 
were reported to be 100% and 80%, respectively. Although the majority of basin 
stakeholders attend the basin meetings, it was made clear by the respondents that some of 
the members of the governing board of the Inkomati CMA were passive and did not 
participate fully in the board deliberations. Most of the members who were alleged to be 
silent during most board meetings are those that represented disadvantaged communities 
of former homelands.  
In the Mozambican part of the Limpopo River basin, information-sharing and 
communication among basin stakeholders occur mostly through meetings. Although 
basin meetings are the main mechanisms used for sharing information, the survey 
respondents were not able to estimate the level (in percentage) of stakeholders’ 
participation. They reported that there is a good stakeholders’ attendance of river basin 
meetings but the decisions are mainly taken by the basin committee, which is presided by 
ARA-Sul. Matsinhe (2011) reports that small farmers and water-user associations located 
                                                          
15Chibwe (2011) reports that each of the following stakeholders (industry, mining, and power generation; 
commercial agriculture; civil society; tourism and recreation; productive use of water by the poor; forestry; 
conservationist; traditional leaders; and SALGA) have a representative in the boards. The remaining 
members represent government agencies.  
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remotely from the decision centers in the Limpopo basin are virtually excluded, and have 
non-meaningful participation in the decision-making process. The same authors indicate 
that farmer associations that are located far from the urban centers where meetings take 
place have claimed that they are not invited to participate in the basin committee 
meetings, and for others it is difficult to participate in the meetings due to the associated 
costs of accommodation and transport. 
The type of devolution used in the process of decentralization: 
Finally, interpreting the results of the three case studies, the decentralization of 
Mzingwane River basin and in the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo basin followed 
top-down devolution, while in the Inkomati the process initially started as a top-down 
approach led by the DWAF Regional Office in Mpumalanga; however, it turned out to be 
a mutually desired process, when stakeholders joined the process.   
Central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Percentage of tariffs remaining at the basin:  
In the Mzingwane River basin, 75% of tariffs stay in the basin and the remaining 
25% is channeled to the central government as value-added tax.  Musinake (2011) reports 
that of all the revenues generated within the basin, stakeholder organizations get much 
less than 1%, while ZINWA, the statutory authority, collects 74% of revenues from water 
tariffs.  
In the Inkomati Water Management Area, according to Chibwe (2011),none of 
the water tariffs are managed by stakeholders and, therefore, the Inkomati CMA does not 
have financial autonomy, and it is heavily dependent upon external donors and the 
government financial resources to finance basin activities. 
In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, none of water tariffs collected remain 
at the basin level. Regarding the possible destinations of water revenues, according to 
regulation of water tariffs (Decree 43/2007), the government retains 100% of the 
collected revenues from water tariffs with the following distribution: 40% of tariff 
revenues go to Ministry of Finance, and 60% to Ministry of Public Work and Housing.   
The main source of river basin budget in the Mzingwane River basin were river 
basin stakeholders, representing 98% of the river basin budget, while 1% is from the 
government, and the remaining 1% is from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The 
fact that the majority of river basin resources are from river basin stakeholders might 
guarantee financial sustainability over time. However, the low contribution from the 
government might indicate the lack of government commitment in the decentralization 
initiative. In the Inkomati, no reliable data was collected on the source of budget. While 
budgetary autonomy is one of the main principles of CMA relations in South Africa, 
Chibwe (2011) reports that the Inkomati CMA has currently two funding profiles: A 
parliamentary allocation that comes from government coffers, and an external funding 
that comes from the donor community. 
Level of authority held by river basin stakeholders on managing river basin resources: 
In the Mzingwane catchment, a shift of the function of water resources allocation 
from the water courts and direct government control into the hands of ZINWA, and 
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Mzingwane catchment council, a stakeholder institution, was a step toward 
decentralization. Additionally, the abolishment of the water rights system in favor of 
renewable water permits has been a catchment-based form of water allocation. In this 
regard, all the water permits issued within the basin have been issued by the stakeholder 
organizations. In the Mozambican portion of Limpopo, the majority (61.9%) of 
respondents reported that the river basin organizations do not have the necessary 
authority/independence in managing water resources. 
The level of authority given to different stakeholder groups to manage river basin 
resources before and after the decentralization process: 
In the Mzingwane catchment, results show that the responsibilities regarding 
infrastructure financing, setting water standards and water quality enforcement are still 
concentrated within the central government, because 100% of the responsibility has been 
given to the national/central government since initiation of the decentralization process. 
Responsibility regarding water administration was shared by local and provincial 
government levels before the decentralization process. The decentralization process 
improved the participation of river basin stakeholders in management of water 
administration. Specifically, 75% of water administration responsibility was given to 
river basin stakeholders, and the remaining 25% was given to local level government.  
Although local-based organizations have been involved in water management, 
Musinake (2011) indicates that the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making is 
marginal, as ZINWA is the supreme body that makes all decisions relating to water in the 
catchment. The Mzingwane catchment council and its constituent at the four sub-
catchment councils are mainly restricted to housekeeping issues. They are only involved 
in preparation of the catchment outline plan, monitoring water flows and data collection, 
and in some part, a conduit for water levies from water users to the national authority. 
Evidently, the distribution of power and authority and discretion over the use of water-
related revenues is highly skewed toward the national authority.  
In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, all survey respondents reported that 
responsibilities regarding infrastructure financing, water-quality enforcement and setting 
water standards are performed by the central government. Additionally, Matsinhe (2011) 
points out that the weak authority given to local organizations can be highlighted by the 
level of authority shared by the government and local-level organizations in the 
management of water infrastructures. Operational management of the hydrological 
resources at the Mozambican portion of Limpopo River basin is performed by ARA-Sul, 
an organization that is subordinated to the national directorate of water (DNA), a 
government-controlled unit. Existing infrastructure, like the Chokwé and Xai-Xai 
Irrigating Schemes, were transferred from central government control to the Chokwe 
hydraulic public enterprise (HICEP) and Baixo Limpopo Irrigation Scheme (BLIS), 
respectively. As both HICEP and BLIS are subordinated to the government through the 
Ministry of Agriculture, this fact suggests that river basin management tasks are mainly 





Configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
River basin organizational structure, including the composition of each organ and its 
function: 
In the Mzingwane catchment, there are two existing main structural arrangements: 
the catchment councils, and ZINWA. The water authority’s affairs are run by a ZINWA 
board, which is composed of ten members.  It is worth noting that issues of policy and 
high-level decision-making relating to water resource management are deliberated at 
ZINWA’s level. What matters most is how this board has been constituted. According to 
Musinake (2011), the state through the minister of water resources appointed the board 
chairman, the chief executive officer, and the four other board members. In addition to 
the board members representing state interests, the responsible minister chose the final 
four members of the board from a list of five prospective members, forwarded by the 
catchment councils (Musinake 2011). This autocracy has found its way to the lowest 
level, as well. Musinake (2011) points out that ZINWA officials, especially at the onset 
of the decentralization initiative, appointed themselves as the sole stakeholders privileged 
to elect representatives in the sub-catchment councils.  
However, Musinake (2011) notes that the current establishment of water-user 
organizations in the Shashe sub-catchment represents a step in the right direction. These 
organizations certainly will enjoy some sort of recognition and support from the non-
government organizations (NGOs), provincial and district-level state structures, as well 
as from research institutes.  
Chibwe (2011) reports that the Inkomati Water Management Area is governed by 
the Inkomati Catchment Management Agency (ICMA). The ICMA is lead by a 
governing board; however, the daily activities of the ICMA are lead by a chief executive 
officer (CEO) assisted by managers and support staff. The ICMA interacts directly with 
three executive committee officers representing the three sub-catchments (Sabie, 
Crocodile, and Komati). Below the executive committees are representatives of water 
users. River basin water users are organized in associations (water-user associations) and 
irrigation boards. The irrigation boards are in the process of being transformed into 
water-user associations (WUA). However, only two irrigation boards have been formed. 
The functionality of the WUAs is still weak, since only one WUA is currently functional.  
The Mozambican portion of the Limpopo River basin is under the management of 
ARA-Sul. The implementation of water related strategies and policies is particularly led 
by the Ministry of Public Works &Housing, which is organized in directorates. The 
directorate responsible for water resource management is the National Directorate for 
Water (DNA), which coordinates the activities of the five regional administrative offices 
(ARAs). Under the decentralization process, operational management of the hydrological 
resources at the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo River basin was given to ARA-Sul. 
ARA-Sul responds to DNA but it has financial and administrative autonomy. At the 
Mozambican portion of the Limpopo River basin, ARA-Sul is represented by the 
Limpopo River basin management unit (UGBL). UGBL works like a section within 
ARA-Sul, and it is responsible for implementing the general scheme of water use at the 
basin level, and ensuring that existing water resources meet existing demand.  
The involvement of river basin’s stakeholders in the management of water 
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resources at the basin level is done through the Limpopo River basin committee.  The 
basin committee is chaired by the UGBL director, a staff member of the ARA-Sul, and it 
is composed of different stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector, 
water-user associations, the Chokwé and Xai-Xai irrigation system managers, religious 
institutions, farmers, and representatives from other economic and political sectors. 
Despite the presence of local stakeholders in the decision-making entities, Matsinhe 
(2011) reports that that UGBL and the Limpopo River basin committee implement 
central government policy at the basin level, and the community members have a small 
share in water management authority and responsibilities. Other water users are 
represented by water-user associations. The Mozambican portion of the Limpopo River 
basin counts actually about sixty water-user associations, of which thirty-two have been 
legally registered. The internal configuration of the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo 
River basin shows evidently the effort of decentralizing the management of river basin 
resources. However, the predominance of government-created institutions with weak 
involvement and functionality of basin-based organizations is still evident. 
Information sharing:  
In the Mzingwane River basin, information-sharing takes place basically through 
basin meetings. However, calendars, annual reports and strategy documents are becoming 
increasingly effective mechanisms as people change their attitudes. Musinake (2011) 
reports that information sharing through basin meetings has been carefully crafted to 
decrease the participation of local stakeholders.  For example, in council meetings in the 
Mzingwane catchment, foreign language (English), Western protocols, and practices have 
been observed and held with high esteem against a background of a less-literate audience. 
Alien language has been ensuring that the interests of scientific, political, and commercial 
stakeholders are prioritized, while the majority of traditional leadership and communal 
interests are sacrificed. 
In the Inkomati, WMA respondents reported that there are different mechanisms 
for information sharing, such as board meetings, annual reports, and radio broadcasts. 
Basin reports and profiles are also used as mechanisms for information sharing. However, 
the limited active participation of basin stakeholders (mainly disadvantaged groups) in 
basin meetings contributes negatively to decentralization process. 
All (100%) case study survey respondents reported that the Mozambican portion 
of the Limpopo River basin has forums for information sharing. Communication among 
members of the same association takes place mostly through meetings. Additionally, 
survey respondents reported that within water-user associations, meetings are scheduled 
on weekly bases, and the meetings among associations are scheduled on an irregular 
basis, depending on the occurrence of problems in the basin. HICEP and the BLIS are 
invited to participate in meetings organized by water-user associations. Interviewees 
indicated that UGBL and water users away from the Chokwé and Xai-Xai irrigation 
systems meet infrequently. At the basin level, the basin committee meets twice a year, 
while HICEP, BLIS, and the water-user associations meet on monthly bases.  
Forums for conflict resolution:  
The Mzingwane River basin has seven forums for conflict resolution, namely 
Mzingwane catchment council and its four sub-catchment councils, ZINWA, and the 
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Ministry of Water Resources Management and Rural Development. However these 
forums do not effectively solve river basin conflicts. According to Musinake (2011), 
developments in the Shashe sub-catchment have revealed that basin stakeholders have 
been denied a forum to get their voices heard by water authorities. In particular, the army 
and police have used force and intimidation to get their interests across.   
In the Inkomati water management area, respondents reported that legal 
arrangements (water tribunals) exist, which have been effectively used for water conflict 
resolutions. In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, 100% of the survey respondents 
pointed out that the Mozambican portion of Limpopo River basin does not have forums 
for conflict resolution at the basin level. The basin committee works slightly like a forum 
to hear disputes, when called for, but without authority to solve them. 
Performance assessment 
The following results show how interviewees interpret the performance of the newly 
established institutions with respect to a number of water management problems before 
and after decentralization. Respondents were asked whether, to their knowledge, selected 
issues existing before decentralization have improved or worsened after the process. 
Level of accomplishment of the river basin objectives: 
The main objectives of Mzingwane River basin decentralization process reported 
by ZINWA officials were reduction of water conflicts and the improvement of equitable 
allocation of water permits. The majority (66%) of respondents of the semi-structured 
questionnaire also reported that the main objective of the Mzingwane River basin 
decentralization process was to improve water allocations. ZINWA officials reported that 
while decentralization has decreased water conflict problems by 75%, it did not improve 
water allocation. The limited success in improvement of water allocation is also 
supported by respondents of semi-structured questionnaire, as the majority (60%) 
reported weak improvement of water allocation in the catchment.   
In the Inkomati WMA, the main objectives of the decentralization process were to 
reduce water scarcity and water conflicts, as well as assuring water quality. Survey 
respondents indicated that these objectives have been reached partially. The 
decentralization process improved by 25% the problems related to water scarcity and 
conflicts, and by 50% the problems related to water quality. These results suggest that 
there are signs of improvement in performance of the decentralization process in the 
Inkomati water management area. 
In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, survey respondents reported that the 
main objectives of the UGBL are to improve water allocation and distribution (85.7%), 
and crop production (14.3%).  The respondents were not able to assess the level of 
accomplishment of these objectives. However, Matsinhe (2011) reports that water 
allocation is still poor, due to lack of improved water distribution infrastructures, and 
crop production is also still low. These findings suggest that the main objectives of the 
UGBL are still far to be attained. 
Level of problems related to river basin stressed resources before and after 
decentralization process: 
Respondents were asked to rank the level of problems associated with the river 
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basin’s stressed resources before and after the decentralization process using the 
following categories: (1) no response, (2) no problem, (3) some problem, and (4) severe 
problems. The evaluated stressed resource problems were: water scarcity, floods, 
environmental quality, land degradation (erosion, salinity, etc.), water conflicts, water 
storage, and river ecology, among others.  
The ZINWA officials indicated that the decentralization process of Mzingwane 
River basin reduced the problems related to water scarcity, water conflicts, and water 
conservation and storage. While water scarcity and conflicts were considered problems 
before decentralization, they were not considered to be a problem after decentralization. 
However, decentralization increased problems related to river ecology and land 
degradation.  Similar to the results reported by ZINWA officials, the results from the 117 
semi-structured questionnaires submitted to river basin stakeholders reveal that 
decentralization decreased problems of water scarcity, and increased problems of 
environmental quality and soil erosion.  
In the Inkomati WMA, the decentralization process did not change the state of the 
majority of the problems listed above, as they were mostly ranked to have some problems 
(category 3) before and after the decentralization process. However, the decentralization 
process improved the availability of water and reduced water conflicts.  Both problems 
shifted from category 4 (severe problem) to category 3 (some problems). These results 
indicate that decentralization performance has been increasing according to the 
respondents. 
In the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, the majority of respondents consider 
that the conditions of stressed resources before the decentralization process are severe, 
and they do not improve substantially after decentralization, which indicates the low 
performance of the process in the Mozambican portion of Limpopo River basin. 
Respondents were finally asked to report the existence of water rights before and 
after the decentralization process, and which takes responsibility for awarding water 
rights, water allocation, modeling and forecasting water availability, monitoring and 
enforcing water quality, and collecting water tariffs before and after the river basin 
decentralization process. 
ZINWA officials indicated that permanent water rights prevailed before the 
decentralization process, and they were replaced by water permits renewable after two 
years through the decentralization of Mzingwane River basin. They also reported that 
responsibility regarding water allocation, modeling, and forecasting water availability 
and collecting tariffs was given to state/provincial government agencies before the 
decentralization process, and it is now performed by the river basin authority (ZINWA).  
In the Inkomati WMA, respondents indicated that before the introduction of the 
new NWA and subsequently the decentralization initiative, there were permanent water 
rights, and these rights were eliminated with the introduction of the new NWA. 
Finally, in the Mozambican portion of the Limpopo, all respondents reported that 
water resources belong to the state, and the rights to use are given by the state. However, 
after the decentralization process, the basin committee has also been responsible for 
water allocation and assigning water use rights. Water quality standards are set by the 
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ministry of environmental coordination (MICOA), and water quality along the Limpopo 
River is monitored by ARA-Sul, along with MICOA. Monitoring the Limpopo River’s 
flows in order to anticipate and identify flooding or insufficiency of water is under the 
responsibility of DNA, ARA-Sul, and the national institute for disaster management 
(INGC) through the emergency operative center (CENOE).  
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Annex 2: Major river basins and river basin organizations in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
The quantitative analysis of this study is based on a sample composed of twenty-seven 
RBOs, located in six countries, distributed over two of the four SSA regions (four RBOs 
in two Eastern African region countries, and twenty-three RBOs in four Southern African 
region countries). The reasons for the use of this sample are described in Chapter 5. As 
the surveyed catchments represent only partially the situation in SSA in terms of water 
governance decentralized institutions, it is useful to present an overview on the major 
basins and basin organizations in SSA countries. This Annex responds to this need and 
strives to contextualize our quantitative analysis within the African landscape. 
Major water basins in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The African continent is composed of over fifty river basins, spanning nearly all its 
countries, some of which are international and some are domestic in nature. Among 
these, the major basins are Senegal, Volta, Niger in West Africa, Lake Chad, Ogooue, 
and Congo in Central Africa, Nile, Lake Turkana, Juba Shibeli in East Africa, and 
Zambezi, Okavango, Limpopo, and Orange in Southern Africa (Figure 2). The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa-UNECA (2010) adds from the list presented 
above the following river basins: Gambia, Sassandra, Comoe, Gueme, and Sanga in West 
Africa, Ogur in Central Africa, Awash, Omo, Tana, Pangani, and Rufuji in East Africa, 
as well as Kunene, Rovuma, and Save in Southern Africa.  
This annex describes river basins affecting water flows in the Sub-Saharan region 
of the African continent. The differences in terms of socio-economic conditions, which 
determine the level of decentralization process and management of river basin resources, 
justify the separation of Northern Africa from the Sub-Saharan region of Africa. Hence, 
the following sections of this annex describe the main features of the major basins 
affecting water flows in different regions of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Major basins in the Western African region 
Senegal basin: the Senegal River basin is estimated to cover an area of 483,180 km2 and 
spread over four countries (Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal). The basin rainfall 
varies from 55mm/year in the valley and delta to 2,000 mm/year in the upper basin in 
Guinea, with an overall basin average of 550 mm/year. The irrigation potential of 
Senegal basin is estimated to be as high as 240,000 hectares in the Senegal River valley. 
In Mauritania, the irrigation potential of the Senegal basin is estimated to be as high as 
125,000 hectares. The total irrigation potential of the Senegal basin is estimated to be 
420,000 hectares. However, only 118,000 hectares is presently under irrigated 
agriculture. 
Volta basin: the Volta River basin is shared by Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Togo. The majority (85%) of the river basin area is shared by 
Burkina Faso and Ghana. The basin covers 67% and 64% of Burkina Faso and Ghana 
land mass, respectively. Rainfall in the basin ranges from 400 mm/year in the North to 
1,800 mm/year in the coastal zone and with evaporation of about 2,500mm/year. The 
irrigation potential of the Volta basin is estimated to be 142,000 hectares.  
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Niger basin: It is the second longest river in Africa after the Nile with about 4,100 
km long, and basin area is estimated to be 1,471,000 km2. The basin spreads over in the 
following countries: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. Niger basin area covers about 7.25% of the African 
continental landmass.  The Niger basin is composed of the Niger River, which originates 
from Guinea with its tributaries of Bani, Gouroval, Dargol, Sirba, Gouroubi, 
Diamamgou, and Tapoa, all originating from Burkina Faso. The other tributaries include 
Mekrou, Alibori, and Sota, originating from Benin and Benue from Chad. The rainfall in 
the basin varies from 1,200 mm/year to 3,000 mm/year in Guinea zone, 500 mm/year to 
1,200 mm/year in Sudanese zone, and 100 mm/year to 500 mm/year in Sahelian zone. 
The total irrigation potential of Niger basin is estimated to be about 2,816,510 ha, while 
the present irrigation area has been estimated at 924,620 ha. Specifically, Niger River 
basin irrigation potential is estimated to be 1,678,510 hectares in Nigeria, 556,000 
hectares in Mali, and 300,000 hectares in Benin. The Niger basin has high hydropower 
potential of about 30,000 GWH with a current installation of 7,000 GWH. 
Major basins in Central African region 
Lake Chad basin: The Lake Chad basin is located in Northern Central Africa and it 
covers almost 8% of the continent and spreads over seven countries (Chad, Niger, 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Algeria, Sudan, and Central Africa). The total basin area is about 
2,381,635km2 and the conventional area (20% of total area) is about 427,500 km2 from 
which 42% is in Chad, 28% in Niger, 21% in Nigeria, and 9% in Cameroon. The basin 
has irrigation potential of about 2.0 million ha from which only 113,296 ha are actually 
under irrigation.  
Ogooue basin: The Ogooue catchment area is estimated to be 223,856 Km2 of 
which 173,000 Km2 (73%) lies within Gabon, and the remaining area is shared by 
Cameron and Congo Brazzaville. The basin is located in the equatorial region and the 
average rainfall is no less than 2.0 meters with 2 to 3 dry months per year. Annual 
evapotranspiriation in the basin is estimated to range from 1,000 mm to 1,250 mm per 
year.  
Congo basin: It is the largest basin in Africa, and the second largest in the world 
next to the Amazon river basin. The Congo catchment area is estimated at 3.7 million 
Km2 and is shared by nine countries, namely: the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
Central African Republic, the Congo (Brazaville), Angola, Cameroon, Burundi, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi, with the largest basin area being in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The Congo River basin consists of Congo River itself, its tributaries 
of Oubangui, Kasai, Sangha, Kuilu, Kwango, Ruki, Lamami, Lulonga, Amwini, and 
other smaller rivers. The average rainfall in the basin ranges from 1,200 mm to more than 
2,000 mm in the center. Congo Catchment has a potential for irrigating 9,800,000 ha and 
it is actually irrigating 35,767 ha.  The Congo basin has a hydropower potential of 39,000 
MW at Inga with only 1,775 MW installed. Additionally it still has large potentials for 
navigation, fishery and Eco-Tourism. 
Major basins in the Eastern African region 
Nile basin:  It is the longest in Africa and second longest in the world. It flows through 
6,700km from Egypt to Tanzania. The Nile catchment is estimated to be over 3 million 
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km2 (approximately 10% of total land surface of African continent) and it covers the 
following countries: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt. The mean annual rainfall over the 
entire basin is about 2,000 billion m3. The irrigation potential of the Nile basin is 
immense. For example, it has a potential to irrigate 4.8 million ha in Egypt, 200,000 ha in 
Uganda, and 300,000 ha in Eritrea. 
Lake Turkana basin: The total basin area is about 130,860 km2. This basin is 
mainly fed by the Lake Turkana, which is situated in the Great Rift Valley in the 
northwestern part of Kenya. Lake Turkana is situated in an arid and hot area with mean 
annual rainfall less than 250 mm. The main tributary of the basin is the River Omo, 
which contributes more than 90% of the total water influx. The second largest river is the 
Turkwel River and the other rivers are temporary, flooding only during sporadic rains. 
The evaporation rate has been estimated at 2,335 mm per year at the basin. The main 
activity in the basin is agriculture (pasture with about 47% of basin area).  
Shebelli – Juba basin: The catchment area is shared by Kenya, Ethiopia, and 
Somalia, and covers a total area of over 810,000 km2 and more than 46% of the basin is 
within Ethiopia. The total rainfall varies from 200 mm/year to 1,800 mm/year with an 
average of 430 mm/year. The potential irrigation in the basin is estimated at 323,000 ha; 
however, less than 200,000 ha is currently under irrigation. 
Major basins in the Southern African region 
Zambezi basin: It is the fourth largest basin (catchment) area in Africa with a basin area 
of over 1.3 million km2 and covers eight countries, namely: Angola, Botswana, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, and Namibia. Similar to the Nile basin, the 
irrigation potential of the Zambezi basin is immense. The annual rainfall in the basin 
varies from 1,800 mm/year in the north to 550 mm/year or less in the south of the basin. 
The total irrigation potential of the Zambezi basin, spreading over eight riparian 
countries, is estimated at 3,160,380 ha, of which less than half is presently under irrigated 
agriculture. Specifically, it is estimated to have a potential to irrigate 1.7 million ha in 
Mozambique, 700,000 ha in Angola, and 422,000 ha in Zambia. The Zambezi basin has 
significant hydropower potential with an installed capacity of 4,620 MW, and about 40 
more sites with a total capacity of 13,000 MW identified. 
Okavango basin: It covers about 725.000 Km2 (approximately 1% of African land 
mass), and it is shared by three countries, namely: Angola, Namibia, and Botswana. The 
rainfall in the basin ranges from 1,300 mm/year in Angola to 300 mm/year and 400 
mm/year in Namibia and Botswana, respectively. The irrigation potential of the 
Okavango basin has been estimated at 200,000 ha in Namibia and 600 ha in Botswana. 
Orange basin: It is shared by Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and South Africa and 
covers almost 3% of the continental landmass with an estimated area of about 896,368 
km2. The rainfall in the basin varies from 35 mm/year to 1,000 mm/year with a mean 
value of 325 mm/year over the basin. The irrigation potential of the Orange River basin is 
25,000 ha in Namibia, 12,500 ha in Lesotho, 352,500 ha in South Africa.  
Limpopo basin: The Limpopo basin is shared by Botswana, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa, and Mozambique and covers an area of almost 402,000 km2, over 46% of which 
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is in South Africa. This basin is composed of the Limpopo River and its tributaries, the 
Shashi and Elephant rivers. The rainfall in the basin ranges from 290 mm/year to 1,040 
mm/year with a mean of 530 mm/year. The irrigation potential of the Limpopo basin in 
South Africa is estimated at 131,500 ha, and 148,000 ha in Mozambique. The overall 
total irrigation potential for the Limpopo basin across the four riparian countries is 
estimated at 295,500 ha, while the area under irrigation at present is about 242,000 ha. 
As described above, the major river basins in Africa are international river basins, 
as they cover more than one country. Some of these river basins have set an international 
framework aiming to governing the management of river basin resources. The next 
section describes the major river basin organization in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
International River Basin Organizations (RBOs) in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The management of river basins described above had been mainly centralized and 
controlled by the government. However, in the past five decades, the world experienced 
changes in the management of water resources. These changes were mainly based on 
attempts to replace the centralized management approach with the integrated water 
resource management (IWRM) approach. IWRM gained acceptance after the 
International Conference on Water and Environment in Dublin in 1992. One of the main 
principles of IWRM is the decentralization of river basins management through the 
creation of river basin organizations.  
Additionally, disputes among countries sharing the same basins and the need to 
implement development projects at the basin level following IWRM principles motivated 
the creation of river basin organizations in form of commissions, committees, and other 
organizational set-ups.  In Africa, these organizations have been created at international 
and national levels with the following goals:  (i) Development of management and action 
plans, (ii) monitoring water flows, (iii) decision-making and procedures for dispute 
resolutions, (iv) finance basin activities and its cooperative structures, (v) environment 
and sustainable management of basin resources, and (vi) engagement of stakeholder 
participation. The major international16  basin organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa by 
region are described below, and the data used to describe the basin organizations are from 
Rangeley et al. (1994), ANBO, AMCOW, and GTZ (2012), and Oregon State University 
(2012).  
International RBOs in the Western African region 
Gambia River Basin Development Organization (OMVG): This is an official organization 
and economic program that was launched in 1978 to manage Corubal, Gambia, and Geba 
River basins and the participant countries are Guinea and Guinea Bissau17. The main 
objective of OMVG is to promote socio-economic integration of its member’s states. The 
specific objectives of OMVG include development of hydro-power/hydro-electricity, 
flood control and relief, irrigation, food security, as well as infrastructure and socio-
economic development of the member states. 
                                                          
16
 National river basin organizations are not described here, due to limited dataset covering all Sub-Saharan 
countries.  
17
 For the Geba River basin, OMVG includes also Senegal. 
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Mano River Union (MRU): It is an official organization established on October 3, 
1973, and the participating countries are Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The MRU 
aims to manage Mana-Morro basin in order to improve living standards of participating 
countries. 
Niger Basin Authority (NBA): The NBA is an official organization established in 
1980 to manage Niger River basin. The NBA was born from the former Niger River 
Commission (RNC), established in 1964. The participating countries are Algeria, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Sierra 
Leone. The aim of the Niger Basin Authority is to promote cooperation among the 
member countries and to ensure integrated development in all fields through development 
of its resources. Specifically, the NBA aims to improve water quality, hydro-power/ 
hydro-electricity, navigation, fishing, flood control and relief, economic development, 
joint management, irrigation, infrastructure development, as well as technical cooperation 
and assistance.  
Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Co-operation (NNJC): It is an official 
commission established in July 18, 1990, with an objective to improve equitable sharing 
in the development, conservation, and use of their common water resources. Specifically, 
it serves as the technical body to advise the governments of the two countries on issues 
related to the management of Niger River basin resources. 
Liptako-Gourma Integrated Authority (Autorite de developpement integre de la 
region du Liptako-Gourma– ALG): The ALG is an official organization and economic 
program that was established in December 3, 1970. The participating countries are 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. ALG’s goal is to promote the integrated development of 
the Liptako-Gourma region in Volta River basin with a view to improving the living 
conditions of the population. The major management issues of ALG are to improve 
hydro-power/hydro-electricity, navigation, fishing, economic development, irrigation, 
and infrastructure development.   
Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du bassin du fleuve Senegal (OMVS): The 
OMVS is an official organization and economic program that was established in March 
11, 1972. The participating countries are Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. The OMVS was 
born from organization of boundary states of the Senegal River (OERS – Organization 
des Etats Riverains du Sénégal), created in 1968. The main goal of OMVS is to oversee 
the development of member countries through sustainable use of the Senegal River basin. 
The main management issues of OMVS are water quality, water quantity, hydro-
power/hydro-electricity, navigation, flood control and relief, economic development, 
joint management, irrigation, infrastructure development, technical cooperation and 
assistance18.  
International RBOs in the Central African region 
International Commission of Congo-Oubangui-Sangha (CICOS): This is an official 
commission composed of members from some countries that share the Congo River basin 
[Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), and Democratic 
                                                          
18The other international river basin organizations in West Africa are Volta Basin Initiative (VBI), Volta 
Basin Authority (VBA), and National Agency for Niger Basin. 
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Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)]. This commission was launched in November 6, 1999, 
and it has been effectively performing its activities since November 23, 2003.  The main 
basin issues addressed by the commission are water quality, navigation, flood control, 
and relief, as well as infrastructure development.  
Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC): It is an official commission established in 
May 22, 1964. The participating countries are Cameroon, Central African Republic19, 
Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. The LCBC was established to manage the basin and to resolve 
disputes that might arise over the lake and its resources. The management issues of the 
LCB are water quality, water quantity, navigation, fishing, economic development, 
irrigation, infrastructure development, technical cooperation and assistance, border 
issues, among others.  
International RBOs in the Eastern African region 
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI): The NBI is an official organization and economic program 
established in 1999. The participating countries are Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic Congo (Kinshasa), Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda. The NBI was born from the Technical Cooperation 
Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the 
Nile Basin (TECCONILE) established in 1993. The main goals of NBI are to enhance 
partnership, promote economic development, and fight poverty throughout the 
sustainable use of basin resources. Its vision is to achieve sustainable socio-economic 
development through the equitable utilization of Nile River basin resources. 
Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin 
(Portion of Nile Basin): It is an official organization established in February 5, 1978, and 
the participating countries are Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The main issues 
that have been addressed under this organization is hydropower infrastructure 
development. 
The Permanent Joint Technical Committee (PJTC): This is an official committee 
that was established in 1959. The participating countries are Egypt and Sudan. The main 
goals of PJTC are to implement Nile Waters Treaty Agreement of 1959, signed by the 
two countries to jointly manage Nile River water resources (mainly water quantity 
management). 
Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization: It is an official organization and 
environmental program established in June 30, 1994. The participating countries are 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The objectives of the organization are to improve 
cooperation among the participating countries in matters regarding Lake Victoria; 
harmonize national measures for the sustainable utilization of the living resources of the 
lake; develop and adopt conservation and management measures to assure the health of 
the lake's ecosystem, and the sustainability of its living resources. The main management 
issues are water quality, fishing, and joint management.  
The Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC): Similar to Lake Victoria Fishery 
                                                          
19
 The Central African Republic was admitted in 1994 and at the same time Sudan was admitted as 
observer. 
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Organization, it is an official organization that was established in June 1, 2006, and the 
participating countries are Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The LVBC was born from the 
Lake Victoria Development Programme (LVDP), and its aim is to jointly manage Lake 
Victoria resources and mainly water quality20. 
International RBOs in the Southern African region 
Tripartite Permanent Technical Commission (TPTC): It is an official commission 
established in February 15, 1991, to manage the Inkomati River basin. The participant 
countries are South Africa, Swaziland, and Mozambique. The main objectives of the 
TPTC are to jointly manage basin infrastructure development, as well as to perform 
technical cooperation and assistance among participating countries.  
Joint Water Commission-Swaziland and South Africa (JWCSSA): It is also an 
official commission established in March 13, 1992.  The JWCSSA was established as a 
technical advisory commission to advise the governments of Swaziland and South Africa 
on water resources of common interest. The JWC is actually monitoring the activities of 
KOBWA on behalf of the governments of Swaziland and South Africa.  
Komati Basin Water Authority (KOBWA): It is an official organization and 
economic program established in 1993 to manage the Inkomati River basin. The 
participant countries are Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland. The purpose of 
KOBWA is to implement Phase 1 of the Komati River basin development project, which 
comprises the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of Driekoppies Dam in 
South Africa, and Maguga Dam in Swaziland. Mozambique is participating in KOBWA 
as a downstream country that can be affected by water flows from the upstream countries 
(South Africa and Swaziland). 
Angola Namibian Joint Commission of Cooperation (ANJCC): It is an official 
commission established in 1996 to manage Kunene River basin. The participant countries 
are Angola and Namibia. The main objectives of the ANJCC are to jointly manage basin 
infrastructure development, as well as to perform technical cooperation and assistance 
among participating countries. 
Limpopo Watercourse Commission (LIMCOM):It is an official commission 
established in November 1, 2003. The participant countries are Botswana, Mozambique, 
South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The main objectives of the LIMCOM are to manage the 
Limpopo River basin resources, and facilitate the building of capacity within the four 
countries to manage the water resource.  
Limpopo River Basin Commission (LRC):  Similar to LIMCOM, it is an official 
commission established in 1995, and the participant countries are Botswana, 
Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Different from LIMCOM, under LRC, 
institutional arrangement to manage water are operating on a river-catchment basis, rather 
than by national boundaries. The LRC provides an appropriate institutional vehicle to 
                                                          
20The other Eastern Africa international basin organizations are Lake Tanganyika Authority, Awash Basin 
Water Resources Administration Agency, and Juba–Shabelli Basin organization. 
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guide the development in the Limpopo River basin. 
Limpopo Basin Permanent Technical Committee (LBPTC): It is an official 
committee that was established in 198621 . The participating countries are Botswana, 
Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The main objective of the LBPTC is to 
advise the parties on issues regarding the Limpopo River basin resources.  
Joint Permanent Technical Committee (JPTC): This is an official organization 
that was established in 1983 to make recommendations on matters concerning common 
interest in the Limpopo River basin. Similar to other Limpopo basin organizations, the 
participating countries in JPTC are Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe.  
Joint Water Commission Mozambique and South Africa (JWCMSA): It is also an 
official commission established in 1996. The participating countries are Mozambique and 
South Africa. The JWCMSA is mainly playing advisory functions on technical matters to 
the respective governments relating Mozambique/South Africa common rivers basins, 
including the Limpopo basin.   
The Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM):It is also an 
official commission, established in September 15, 1994. The participating countries are 
Angola, Botswana, and Namibia. The OKACOM is aimed to ensure that the water 
resources of the Okavango River system are managed in appropriate and sustainable 
ways, and to foster cooperation and coordination between the three basin states: Angola, 
Namibia, and Botswana. 
Joint Permanent Water Commission (JPWC): It is an official commission 
established in November 13, 1990. The participating countries are Botswana and 
Namibia.  The main goal of JPWC is to enhance bilateral management of the Okavango 
River and the Kwando-Chobe-Linyati basins. 
Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM): It is an official commission 
established in November 3, 200022. The participating countries are Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, and South Africa. The ORASECOM is the first RBO to be established in terms 
of the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems with the goal to manage jointly 
Orange-Senqu River basin. 
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA): It is an official organization 
and economic program established in 1930. The participating countries are Lesotho and 
South Africa. Initially, the LHDA was established to implement and operate the part of 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) that falls within the borders of Lesotho. 
Actually, LDHA has engaged on issues related to water quantity, hydro-power and 
hydro-electricity, economic development, joint management, and technical cooperation 
and assistance.  
Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC): The LHWC was born with the 
signing of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) treaty by the government of 
                                                          
21The LBPTC did not function during its first ten years and a second meeting aimed to revitalize it was held 
in South Africa in 1995.  
22The secretariat of ORASECOM was established in 2003. 
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Lesotho and of the Republic of South Africa on the October 24, 1986.  In order to 
implement LHWP, the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC) was established to 
represent the two countries. The JPCT was later renamed the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Commission (LHWC) with the goal to oversee the LHWP treaty. 
Permanent Water Commission (PWC): It is an official commission established in 
1992. The participating countries are Namibia and South Africa. The PWC was 
established to act as a technical adviser to the parties on matters relating to the 
development and utilization of the Orange water resources. 
Joint Irrigation Authority (JIA): It is an official organization and economic 
program that was established in 1992. The participating countries are Namibia and South 
Africa. The main goal of JIA is to administer the existing irrigation scheme along the 
riverbanks under the auspices of the PWC.  
Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM): It is an official commission 
created in July 13, 2004. The participating countries are Angola, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  The ZAMCOM is composed of three organs: a council of 
ministers, a technical committee, and a secretariat, drawn from all eight countries. The 
secretariat advises member countries on planning, utilization, protection, and 
conservation issues around the Zambezi River. The major management issues are 
mediating disputes among participating countries. 
Zambezi River Authority (ZRA): Like ZAMCOM, it is an official organization and 
economic program established in 1987. The participating countries are Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. The ZRA council is governed by four ministers (two from Zambia and the 
other two from Zimbabwe). ZRA’s mission is to cooperatively manage and develop an 
integrated and sustainable management of the Zambezi River water resources in order to 
supply quality water, hydrological and environmental services for the maximum socio-
economic benefits to Zambia, Zimbabwe and the other countries sharing the Zambezi 
River basin. ZRA’s management issues are water quality, economic development, joint 
management, technical cooperation and assistance.23 
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Annex 3: Original variables in the dataset and construction of additional 
variables 
Name of the Variable Definition Categories 
1.barea area of river basin in square km  
2.ptotal total population in the river basin  
3.%rural  percentage rural population in the river 
basin  
 





1300, 8=1400-1500, 9= 
1600-1700, 10= 1800-1900, 
11= 2000-2100, 12= 2200-
2300, 13= 2400-2500, 14= 
2600-2700, 15= 2800-2900   





1300, 8=1400-1500, 9= 
1600-1700, 10= 1800-1900, 
11= 2000-2100, 12= 2200-
2300, 13= 2400-2500, 14= 
2600-2700, 15= 2800-2900   
5.wresources river basin water resources in million 
cubic meters p/y 
 
6.countriesshare number of countries sharing river basin   
7.iyeadecentr period over which decentralization 
occurred in years 
 
8.iyearrbo year of creation of river basin   
9.iobjectwaterconflict water conflict as RBO objective  0 = No, 1 = Yes 
9.iobjectflood flood control as RBO objective  0 = No, 1 = Yes 
9.iobjectwaterscarcity water scarcity as RBO objective  0 = No, 1 = Yes 
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9.iobjectothers1,2,3, other objective 0= n/a,1 = pollution,2 = 
water resources 
management,3 = water 
quality,4 = hydropower,5 = 
planning,6 = stabilization of 
aquifer,7 = conservation,8 = 
water allocation/ 
distributiion,9 = 
development schemes,10 = 
public awareness,11 = 
resource evaluation,12 = 
maintenance,13 = water 
management education,14 = 
hydrological work,15 = 
sanitation and water 
supply,16 = watershed 
conservation,17 = improve 
efficiency,18 = 
navigation,19 = flood 
control,20 = water 
scarcity,21 = water 
conflicts,22 = water 
utilization,23 =   
recreation,24 = dam 
safety,25 = river 
administration  
10.ifloodscale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
10.iwaterscarcescale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
10.iwaterconflictscale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
10.iother1scale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
10.iother2scale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
11.ibody governing body of river basin 
organization 
0 = “N/A”,1 = “Federal”,2 
= “State Authority”’3 = 
“State owned company”,4 = 
“Regional Authority”,5 = 
“Regional 
Board/Council/Committee”, 
6=3 and 5 
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12.igover-body-selct  selection process of governing body of 
the river basin - Nominated 
1= ‘N/A’ 2= ‘Federal 
Government’ 3= ‘State’ 4= 
‘Local Government’ 5= 
‘Users 
12.igover-body-selct  selection process of governing body of 
the river basin - Appointed 
1= ‘N/A’ 2= ‘Federal 
Government’ 3= ‘State’ 4= 
‘Local Government’ 5= 
‘Users 
12.igover-body-selct  selection process of governing body of 
the river basin - Designated 
1= ‘N/A’ 2= ‘Federal 
Government’ 3= ‘State’ 4= 
‘Local Government’ 5= 
‘Users 
14.icreationrbo method of RBO creation  0 = “N/A”,1 = Bottom-
up”,2 = Top-Down 
15.iinstdismantled institutions dismantled in 
decentralization process 
0 = n/a, 1= Ministry/ 
Department of Water, 2= 
Irrigation Boards, 3= 
Regional Water Authority, 
4= Local Authority, 5= 
River boards, 6= 
Administration court, 7= 
UDAH 
16.iinewinstitution  new institutions that had to be created 
in decentralization process 
0 = n/a, 1= Ministry/ 
Department of Water, 2= 
Irrigation Boards, 3= 
Regional Water Authority, 
4= Local Authority, 5= 
RBO/ water user 
associations/ catchment 
council 
17.icostdecentinstitutions cost of the decentralization process  0 = none, 1=Low, 2=2, 3=3, 
4=4, 5=high  
18.iforumsyesno do forums exist for hearing disputes  0 = No, 1 = Yes 
19.iissuesresolved main types of disputes/issues that 
usually need resolving 
0= n/a, 1= water quality, 




7=ground water pollution, 
8= floods, 9= water 
allocation, 10= Siltation, 
11= water use/ legal/illegal, 
12= All, 13=1-2-5 
20.iwaterassociations degree of involvement of water user 
associations  
0= n/a,1 = 0%, 2=25%, 3= 
50%, 4= 75%, 5= 100% 
20.iwaterassociationsyesno have water user associations been 
established  
0 = No, 1 = Yes 
21.itypesinfrustcanal quantity of canals in the basin   
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before   
25.indprobbfloods level of flooding problems before 
establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe problem 
25.indprobbwaterscarcity  level of water scarcity problems before 
establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe problem 
25.indprobbenvquality level of environmental quality problems 
before establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe problem 
25.indprobbwaterconflicts level of water conflict problems before 
establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe problem 
25.indprobblanddegrad level of land degradation problems 
before establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe problem 
25.indprobbdevelpissues level of problems with development 
issues before establishment of RBO  
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe problem 
25.othername other problems (before and after) the 
establishment of RBO 
0 = n/a,1 = water mgt issues 
and authority crises,2 = 
Env. Awareness,3 = 
Organization,4 = 
Hydropower,5 = Water 
Supply,6 = Drought  
25.indprobbother level of other problems before 
establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe problem  
after   
25.indprobafloods level of flooding problems after 
establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 = 
situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbwaterscarcity  level of water scarcity problems after 
establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 = 
situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbenvquality level of environmental quality problems 
after establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 = 
situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbwaterconflicts level of water conflict problems after 
establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 = 
situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobblanddegrad level of land degradation problems after 
establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 = 
situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbdevelpissues level of problems with development 
issues after establishment of RBO  
-1 = situation worsened, 0 = 
situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
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25.indprobbother level of other problems after 
establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 = 
situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
   
26.iadmblocal percentage of water administration 
decision making at local level before 
RBO 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iadmbbasin percentage of water administration 
decision making at basin level before 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iadmbstate percentage of water administration 
decision making at state level before 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iadmbgov  percentage of water administration 
decision making at government level 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ifinblocal percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the local level 
before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ifinbbasin percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the basin level 
before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ifinbstate percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the state level before 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ifinbgov percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the government 
level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ienfblocal percentage of water quality enforcement 
decision making at the local level 
before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ienfbbasin percentage of water quality enforcement 
decision making at the basin level 
before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ienfbstate  percentage of water quality enforcement 
decision making at the state level before 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ienfbgov percentage of water quality enforcement 
decision making at the government 
level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.istdsblocal percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at the 
local level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.istdsbbasin percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at the 
basin level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
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26.istdsbstate percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at the 
state level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.istdsbgov percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at the 
government level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iotherblocal26 percentage of decision making for other 
responsibilities at the local level before 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iotherbbasin26 percentage of decision making for other 
responsibilities at the basin level before 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iotherbstate26 percentage of decision making for other 
responsibilities at the state level before 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iotherbgov26 percentage of decision making for other 
responsibilities at the government level 
before the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
   
26.iadmalocal percentage of water administration 
decision making at the local level after 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iadmabasin percentage of water administration 
decision making at the basin level after 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iadmastate percentage of water administration 
decision making at the state level after 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iadmagov  percentage of water administration 
decision making at the government 
level after the creation of RBO 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ifinalocal percentage of water administration 
decision making at the local level after 
the creation of RBO 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ifinabasin percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the basin level after 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ifinastate percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the state level after 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ifinagov percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the government 
level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ienfalocal percentage of water quality enforcement 
decision making at the local level after 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
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26.ienfabasin percentage of water quality enforcement 
decision making at the basin level after 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ienfastate percentage of water quality enforcement 
decision making at the state level after 
the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.ienfagov percentage of water quality enforcement 
decision making at the government 
level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.istdsalocal percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at the 
local level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.istdsabasin percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at the 
basin level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.istdsastate percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at the 
state level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.istdsagov percentage of decision making on 
setting of water quality standards at the 
government level after creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iothername  other responsibilities  1 = Quality objectives,2 = 
O & M,3 = Management,4 
= Planning,5 = Water 
Supply 
26.iotheralocal percentage of the decision making for 
other responsibilities at the local level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iotherabasin percentage of the decision making for 
other responsibilities at the basin level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iotherastate percentage of the decision making for 
other responsibilities at the state level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
26.iotheragov percentage of the decision making for 
other responsibilities at the government 
level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-100%  
28.wrmibresponsiblerigths responsibility for awarding water rights 
before RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
National agency,6 = River 
Basin Organization 
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29.wrmibresponsibleallocation responsibility for water allocation 
before RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
30.wrmibresponsiblemodfore responsibility for modeling and 
forecasting water availability before 
RBO existence  
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
31.wrmibresponsiblemonit responsibility for monitoring and 
enforcement of water quality before 
RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
32.wrmiaresponsibletariff responsibility for collecting tariffs after 
RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
27.wrmibwatertypes water rights after RBO existence  0 = None,1 = Permanent 
Rights,2 = Long-Term use 
concession (> 10 yrs),3 = 
Short-Term use concession 
(<10 yrs),4 = Permanent 
Transferable,5 = Permanent 
non-transferable 
28.wrmibresponsiblerigths responsibility for awarding water rights 
after RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 
=Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Org 
29.wrmibresponsibleallocation responsibility for water allocation after 
RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Org 
30.wrmibresponsiblemodfore responsibility for modeling and 
forecasting water availability after RBO 
existence  
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Org 
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31.wrmibresponsiblemonit responsibility for monitoring and 
enforcement of water quality after RBO 
existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Org 
32.wrmiaresponsibletariff responsibility for collecting tariffs after 
RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = 
Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Org 
53.part-intl-bsn-treaty  river basin part of an international basin 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
54.flow-var-flact-overtime  does water flow in basin fluctuate 
across the year 
0 = No, 1 = Yes 
55.res-dist-equal-bfor-decentr  river resources equitably distributed 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
56.bfor-ben-2-gov  who benefited most before rbo 1 = federal government,  2 
= local leaders, 3= 
commercial farmers, 4 = 
small farmers 
57.res-dist-equal-aftr-decentr  basin resources equitably distributed 
after RBO 
0 = No, 1 = Yes 
58.ftr-ben-2-gov  who benefited most after rbo 1 = federal government,  2 
= local leaders, 3= 





Annex 4: Revised River Basin Organization (RBO) Questionnaire 
Dear Survey Respondent24:  
This survey is part of a research project that tries to assess in which way the creation of 
River Basin Organizations (RBO) leads to the decentralization of water resources 
management to other(lower levels) of decision-making. The research project also tries to 
assess in which way the creation of RBOs leads to improved water resources 
management results.  
The specific information (in the box below) regarding each individual basin will be kept 
in confidentiality not to allow identification of the River Basin Organization.  
The results of the research effort will be made publicly available and, hopefully, help in 
the continent-wide effort to bring about sustainable integrated water resources 
management.  
If you find you do not have enough space to fill out the questionnaire, you can expand the 
sections in this Word document or provide annexing sheets.  
Your collaboration in this effort is highly appreciated. 
                                                          
24
 This questionnaire is the result of adaptation made in the questionnaire developed by Dinar et al. (2005). 
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1. RIVER BASIN IDENTIFICATION 
 
2. DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS 
Part A: Laws, Acts and Decrees 
2.1. Has the country developed and enacted water related laws, decrees, acts, etc. that have 
influenced the management of water resources in the country? 1. Yes; 2. No 
2.2. If yes in question 2.1., have the local people contributed to the development of water related 
issues (laws, decrees, acts, etc.): 1. Yes; 2. No 
2.3. If yes to question 2.2., who was more active in crafting the rules? 
1. Politicians; 2. Government officials; 3. Traditional structure and local people 
4. Other____________________________; 5. Other____________________________ 
2.4. How often these rules are broken by the local people? 
1. Never broken; 2. Seldom broken; 3.Regularly broken; 4. Not followed at all. 
2.5. In your opinion, did the present water laws contribute to decentralization of water resource 
















2.7. To date, are those objectives attained?   
1. Not at all; 2. 25%  attained; 3. 50% attained; 4. 75%  attained; 5. 100% attained 
2.8. Period (years) that the decentralization took place in the country_________________ 
Part B: Institutions 
3.1. What was the Year that the River Basin Organization was created______________ 
3.2. What was the type of devolution of the River Basin Organization Creation? 
1. Top-down; 2. Bottom-up; 3. Both 





3.4. Who created the River Basin Organization?1. Government; 2. Private sector; 3.Civil society; 
4.Local community; 5.NGOs6. Other_____________ 
3.5. Have the local people contributed to the development of the River Basin Organization? 1. 
Yes; 2. No 
3.6. If yes to question 3.15, who was more active in creating the River Basin Organization? 
1. Politicians; 2. Government officials; 3. Traditional structure and local people 
4. Other____________________________; 5. Other____________________________ 












3.9. Describe the new organizations that had to be created in the decentralization process 












3.11. What are the new organizations at river basin level that had to be created in the 
decentralization process? ______________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
3.12. What were the costs of creating organizations due to decentralization process? 
a. None  b. Low cost  c. Medium cost  d. High cost 
3.13. In developing the river basin organization, what are the difficulties that have been 





3.14. What are the main objectives of the River Basin Organization? 
1. Flood control; 2. Water scarcity; 3.Water conflicts; 4.Assuring water quality; 5. Other______ 
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3.15. To date are those objectives attained? 
Flood Control               Water Scarcity         Water Conflicts       Assuring Water Quality       Other 
 








3.18. Can you please provide the composition of governing body of the river basin organization 
including the type of stakeholders (water users) that they represent as well as the level of 
education? 








Name     Type of water user  Education 
__________________  ________________  _______________________ 
__________________  ________________  _______________________ 
__________________  ________________  _______________________ 
__________________  ________________  _______________________ 
__________________  ________________  _______________________ 
__________________  ________________  _______________________ 
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3.20. Does the River Basin Organization have human capacity to manage water resource at basin 
level? 1. Yes; 2. No. 
3.21. Are there capacity building programs for the River Basin Organization’s stakeholders? 1. 





3.22. Explain the laws of the land and decrees that govern the River Basin Organization. Please 





Part C: Finance 
3.23. Do you measure your basin’s revenues? 1. Yes; 2. No If no, please go to question 3.26. 
3.24. If yes in question 3.23, please indicate the basin’s yearly revenues and the basin population 
in the past five years. 
Year Revenues  River Basin Population 
2010   
2009   
2008   
2007   
2006   
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Other  (name______________________)  
Other (name_______________________)  
 
3.26. What is the value of water Tariffs for different water users (if possible provide rates for 
various major users):  










3.27. Can you indicate the percentage of users paying tariffs for the different water users? 
Indicate in table below using the following choices of percentage of water users paying tariffs: 1. 
Not applicable; 2. 0%; 3.25%; 4.50%; 5. 75%;  6. 100%. 









3.28. Which percentage of the tariff payments stays in the basin and which percentage goes to 
other destinations? Which destinations? 
3.28a. Percentage of tariffs staying in the Basin: 1. Not applicable; 2. 0%; 3.25%; 4.50%; 5.75%; 
6. 100%. 
3.28b.Percentage of tariffs going to other Destinations: 1. Not applicable; 2. 0%;  
3. 25%;   4. 50%;   5. 75%;  6. 100%. 
3.28c.What are the destinations of water tariff __________________________________ 
3.29. Extent/activities of private sector involvement in basin investments (e.g. water supply, 
water treatment, reservoir construction, basin infrastructure maintenance): Percent Private 
Involvement: ______________________________ (1. Not applicable  2. 0%   3. 25%  4. 50%   
5. 75%   6. 100%) 
3.30. What is the annual budget of the river basin organization? _________________ 
 87 
3.31. What are the major sources and their contribution for the annual budget? 
Sources Percentage (0-100%) 
Government  
Private sector  (name________________)  
NGOs  (name______________________)  
Stakeholders at River Basin  
Other  (name______________________)  
Other (name_______________________)  
 
3.32. What is the distribution of the annual budget in percentage among different activities at 
River Basin? 
Activities Percentage (0-100%)  
Investment  
Development  
Water quality  
Capacity building and meetings  
Other  (name______________________)  
Other (name_______________________)  
 
3.33. Does the River Basin Organization have the necessary authority/independence in managing 






3.34. Are some of the decisions made by the River Basin Organization delayed by the 
government? 1. Yes; 2. No.  
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3.35. If yes to question 3.34, how do you rate the impact of these delays on service delivery? 1. 
None; 2. Moderate; 3. Severe 
Part D: Information sharing 
3.36. How often the River Basin Organization call for a meeting?1. Never; 2. When need rise; 3. 
Twice a year; 4.Quarterly; 5.Monthly6. Other__________________ 
3.37. Can you rate the participation of stakeholders at the meeting? Percentage of members 
attending the meeting (0-100%)______________________________ 
3.38. What types of issues are frequently discussed on these meetings?1. Politics and non water 
issues; 2. Some water issues; 3. Purely important water issues4. Other ___________________; 
5. Other ___________________ 






3.40. What are the other forms of information sharing among stakeholders (annual reports, 





Part E: Disputes and their Resolution 









3.43. How often these conflicts rise? 1. Never; 2. Rarely; 3.Often; 4.Very often. 
Meeting issue    Percentage(%) 
1. Politics and non water issues ________________ 
2. Some water issues   ________________ 









4. DECENTRALIZATION PERFORMANCE 
4.1. Indicators of problems before and after establishment of the RBO. Please check all that apply 
in the table bellow for each water resource problem at river basin before and after de 
establishment of RBO using the following choices: 1. No response; 2. No problem;  
3. Some problem; 4. Severe problem. 
Water resource problem at the River basin Before After 
Water scarcity   
Floods   
Environmental quality    
Land degradation (erosion, salinity, etc.)   
Water conflicts (water allocation, etc.)   
Water storage   
River ecology   
Other (specify)   
Other (specify)   
 
4.2. Describe the major water resource problems at the river basin before and after the 






4.3. Responsibilities for decision making before and after the creation of the RBO. Please 
indicate the share of decision making of different levels of governance (municipal, basin, 
provincial and national) for the areas (water administration, etc.) indicated in table below before 
and after the establishment of RBO using the following choices of share (in %) in decision 




Before the creation of the RBO After the creation of the RBO 















































































4.4. Water Resource Management Instruments: Compare the situation before and after the existence of the RBO:  
 Before RBO After RBO 
Existence of water right types (e.g. 
concessions, permanent rights, short-term 




































O Permanent Rights 
O Long-Term Use Concession (more than 10 years) 
O Short-Term Use Concession (less than 10 years) 
O Permanent Transferable 
O Permanent Non-Transferable 
O None 
O Permanent Rights 
O Long-Term Use Concession (more than 10 years) 
O Short-Term Use Concession (less than 10 years) 
O Permanent Transferable 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 





























O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 
O River Basin Organization 
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Who is responsible for modeling and 





















Who is responsible for monitoring and 




















O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 































O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 
O River Basin Organization 
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4.5. Describe the reduction in loss of production and productivity due to water scarcity or 







4.6. Quantify and describe disputes regarding water allocation or water quality before and after 





5. BASINS COMPARISONS 
5.1. In your opinion, are there some characteristics about this river basin that make it different 
from other basins in the country? 1. Yes; 2. No 
5.2. If yes in question 5.1, what are these characteristics and can you please mention the 





5.3. Is the river basin in question part of an international basin that is subject to an existing 
treaty or an international RBO?  1. Yes; 2. No 
5.4. In your opinion does the water flow in the basin highly fluctuate across years? 1. Yes; 2. No 
5.5. In your opinion does the river basin resources uniformly distributed before the 
decentralization process? 1. Yes; 2. No 
5.6. If no in question 5.5, who benefited more from river basin resources before the 
decentralization process? 1. Government, 2.  Local leaders,  3. Commercial Farmers;  4. 
Smallholder farmers,  5.  Other________________  
5.7. In your opinion does the river basin resources uniformly distributed after the 
decentralization process? 1. Yes; 2. No 
5.8. If no in question 5.7, who benefited more from river basin resources after the 
decentralization process? 1. Government, 2.  Local leaders, 3. Commercial Farmers;  4. 
Smallholder farmers,  5.  Other________________  
5.9. Any comments clarifications including annexed material you think may be of value? 
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Tables 
Table 1. Studied variables and their derived impact on decentralization process and 
performance in the three studied catchments 








Contextual factors & initial conditions  
Level of economic development  ▼▼a ▲ ▼▼ 
Distribution of resources among basin 
stakeholders 
▼ ▼ ▼ 
Stakeholders managerial skills ▲ ▲▼ ▼ 
Characteristics of decentralization 
process 
 
Composition of catchment boards & 
degree of stakeholders participation 
▼▼ ▲ ▲▼ 
Stakeholders involvement in 
decentralization process 
▼ ▲ ▼ 
Type of devolution of the 
decentralization process 
▼ ▲ ▼ 
Central government/basin-level 
relationships and capacities 
 
Source of river basin budget ▲▼ ▼ NA 
Percentage of water tariffs remaining at 
the basin 
▲▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ 
Level of management authority given to 
basin stakeholders 
▲▼ NA ▼ 
Configuration of basin-level 
institutional arrangements  
 
Presence of basin-level governance 
institutions 
▲ ▲ ▲ 
Information sharing ▲▼ ▲▼ ▲ 
Mechanism for conflict resolution ▲▼ ▲ ▼ 
aNotes: ▲▲ = highly positive impact; ▲ = positive impact; ▼▼ = highly negative impact; ▼ 
= negative impact; ▲▼ = contrasted impact. 
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Table 2. Decentralization performance according to respondents in the three studied 
catchments 










 ▲▼ ▼ 
Improvement of problems related to river 
basin stressed resources after 
decentralization 
▲▼ ▲▼ ▼ 
Introduction of water permits ▲ ▲ ▲ 
aNotes: ▲▲ = very good  performance; ▲ = good performance; ▼▼ = very bad performance; 
▼ = bad performance; ▲▼ = contrasted performance. 
 
Table 3. Decentralization process 
Dependent Var. 
 
WUAs Involvement RBO Created Institutions 
Dismantled 
Budget per Capita NI NI NI 
Creation Bottom-Up + + + 
Disputes over allocation - + NI 
Governing Body NI NI NI 
International Treaty + + + 
Political Cost + + + 
Relative water scarcity NI + + 
Share of surface water NI NI + 
Water flow fluctuates NI NI + 
WUA Involvement NI NI NI 









Success over Objectives Problems after Decentralization 
Budget Per Capita NI + 
Creation Bottom-Up  + 
Disputes over Allocation NI NI 
Governing Body + NI 
Institutions Dismantled NI NI 
International Treaty + NI 
Political Cost - - 
RBO Created NI NI 
Relative Water Scarcity NI NI 
Share of SW +/- NI 
Water Flow Fluctuates - NI 
WUA Involvement NI NI 




Table 5. Initial set of identified river basins in SSA by region. 
Region Number of reported river basins 
Southern Africa 34 
West Africa 30 
Central Africa 14 
East Africa 21 
Total 99 
Source: ANBOAMCOW and GTZ, 2012. 
 
Table 6. List of identified river basins in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Number River basin Country 
Southern Africa  
1 Berg  South Africa  
2 Cuanza  Angola 
3 Cuvelai/Etosha Namibia, Angola  
4 Fish  Namibia  
5 Groot  South Africa  
6 Ihosy Madagascar  
7 Kafue   Zambia 
8 Inkomati South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique 
9 Kuiseb Namibia  
10 Kunene  Angola (as Cunene), Namibia, Botswana 
11 Kwando  Namibia  
12 Limpopo  Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana 
13 Buzi Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
14 Luangwa  Zambia  
15 Licungo Mozambique  
16 Ligonha Mozambique  
17 Lurio Mozambique  
18 Messalo Mozambique  
19 Mangoky Madagascar  
20 Mania  Madagascar  
21 Maputo/Usutu/Pangola South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique 
22 Molopo  Botswana, South Africa 
23 Okavango,  Botswana, Angola, Namibia 
24 Onilahy Madagascar  
25 Orange  South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, 
26 Pungwe Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
27 Shangani Zimbabwe  
28 Tugela  South Africa  
29 Vaal  South Africa  
30 Zambezi  Angola, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique 
31 Savi/Sabi Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
32 Rovuma Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi 
33 Umbeluzi Mozambique, Swaziland 
34 ReVive  Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe 
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Table 6 – Cont. 
Number River basin Country 
Central West Africa 
1 Bandama Côte d'Ivoire  
2 Cavally  Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire 
3 Cestos Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire 
4 Komoe Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali 
5 Gambia  Gambia, Senegal, Guinea 
6 Niger  Nigeria, Benin, Niger, Mali, Guinea 
7 Oueme Benin  
8 Saint Paul  Liberia  
9 Sanaga Cameroon  
10 Akpa Cameroon  
11 Atui Mauritania, Western Sahara 
12 Sankarani Mali  
13 Sassandra Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea 
14 Tano Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire 
15 Corubal Guinea, Guinea Bissau 
16 Senegal  Mauritania, Mali, Senegal  
17 St. Jone (Africa) Liberia, Guinea 
18 Geba Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Guinea 
19 Great Scarcies  Guinea, Sierra Leone 
20 Little Scarcies Sierra Leone, Guinea 
21 Loffa Liberia, Guinea 
22 Mana-Morro Liberia, Siera Leone 
23 Mbe Gabone, Equatoria Guinea 
24 Moa Sierra Leone, Guinea 
25 Mono Togo, Benin 
26 Volta  Ghana, Burkina Faso 
27 Bia Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana 
28 Cross Nigeria, Cameroon  
29 Utamboni Gabon, Equatorial Guinea 




Table 6 – Cont. 
Number River basin Country 
Central África 
1 Logone - Chari  (Central African Republic) 
2 Kwango Congo  
3 Kasai  Congo  
4 Lualaba Congo  
5 Lomami  Congo  
6 Chiloango Democratic Republic of the Congo  
7 Uele - Ubangi  Democratic Republic of the Congo  
8 Mbomou - Ubangi -  Democratic Republic of the Congo  
9 Gabon    
10 Kouilou-Niari Congo  
11 Mbini/Benito Equatorial Guinea 
12 Ntem Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon 
13 Nyanga Gabon  
14 Ogooué Gabon  
East África 
1 Awash  Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia  
2 Jubba Somalia  
3 Dawa Ethiopia  
4 Gebele Ethiopia  
5 Kerio Kenya  
6 Lotagipi Swamp  Kenya, Sudan 
7 Baraka Eritrea, Sudan 
8 Gash Eritrea, Sudan, Etiopia 
9 Lake Natron  Tanzania, Republic of Kenya 
10 Lake Turkana  Ethiopia, Kenya 
11 Umba Tanzania, Republic of Kenya 
12 Mara  Kenya, Tanzania 
13 Omo Ethiopia  
14 Nile  Sudan, Ethiopia 
15 Lake Chad  Chad, Niger 
16 Atbarah Sudan, Ethiopia 
17 Blue Nile  Sudan, Ethiopia 
18 Didessa R Ethiopia  
19 Mountain Nile  Sudan  
20 Bahr el Zeraf Sudan  












Basins with no 
decentralization 
Basin with no 
information about 
decentralization 
Southern Africa Region 
Angola   7  
Botswana   4  
Lesotho   1  
Madagascar   4  
Mozambique25 13    
Namibia  10   
South Africa 2 17   
Swaziland 1 2   
Zambia   3  
Zimbabwe 7    
Subtotal 23 29 19 0 
West Africa Region 
Ivory Coast    1 
Benin    1 
Liberia    1 
Cameroon    2 
Ghana   4  
Guinée    1 
Mali    1 
Mauritania    1 
Nigeria    1 
Senegal    1 
Subtotal 0 0 4 10 
Central African Republic    1 
DR Congo   4 4 
Equatorial Guinea    1 
Gabon    2 
Subtotal 0 0 4 8 
East Africa Region 
Ethiopia    4 
Kenya  5   
Malawi   1  
Sudan    4 
Tanzania 9    
Uganda   1  
Subtotal 9 5 2 8 
Central Africa Region 
Central African Republic    1 
Democratic Republic 
Congo   4 4 
Equatorial Guinea    1 
Gabon   1 1 
Subtotal 0 0 6 8 
Total  32 34 29 26 
Source: Modified from PEGASYS (2013). 
                                                          
25Mozambican respondents to our survey indicated that RBOs in that country are established. Compared 
to the level of development of the RBOs of other African countries, it would probably be more correct to 
put Mozambican RBOs in the second column, where water decentralization process is “in progress”. 















Names of basins 
included 
Mozambique 13  5 Limpopo, Inkomati, Buzi, Save, Pungwe 
Kenya  5 1 Lake Victoria 








Swaziland 1 2 2 Komati, Usuthu 




Tanzania 9  3 Rufuji, Wami/Ruvu, Internal Drainage 
Total in sample 30 26 27  
Total in region 
(Table 2) 30 36 N/A N/A 
Note: While some similar basin names can be found in different countries, each represent a 
different RBO, with no physical or institutional interaction between these RBOs. 
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Table 9. The final RBOs included in the analysis 
River basin organization Country 
Lake Victoria Kenya 
AraSul Limpopo Mozambique 
Ara Centro Buzi Mozambique 
AraCentorPungue Mozambique 
Ara Centro Save Mozambique 
AraSulInkomati Mozambique 
Komati River Basin Authority Swaziland 
Usuthu River Basin Authority Swaziland 
Breede Overberg Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
InkomatiUsuthu Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Crocodile West Marico Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Upper Orange Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Mvoti to Umzimkulu Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Middle Vaal Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Tukela Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Usutu to Mhaltuze Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Olifants Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Limpopo Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Rufiji Basin Water Board  Tanzania 
WamiRuvu Basin Water Board Tanzania 
Internal Drainage Basin Water Board Tanzania 
Gwayi Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Manyame Catchment Council  Zimbabwe 
Mazowe Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Mzingwana Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Sanyati Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Save Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Source: PEGASYS (2013:33). 
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
River basin part of an international basin 25 0.68 0.4760 0 1 
Does water flow in basin fluctuates across 
the year 25 0.76 0.4358 0 1 
River basin resources equitably distributed 25 0.16 0.3741 0 1 
Budget percapita 17 6.6131 15.7686 0.1785 66.4250 
Forum to solve dispute 23 1.0869 0.4170 0 2 
Governing Body 22 4 1.661 1 6 
Method of Creation 27 1.5925 0.5007 1 2 
Creation Bottom-Up 27 0.4074 0.5007 0 1 
Creation Top-Down 27 0.5925 0.5007 0 1 
Existence of political cost 25 3.56 1.3868 0 5 
Relative water scarcity 17 0.5230 0.3308 0.0864 1.5 
Share surface water 23 4.4781 0.9472 1 5 
Water Users Association involvement 24 1.6666 1.007 1 5 
Year of creation 18 1999 7.3163 1979 2009 
Years of decentralization 23 9.4782 6.4938 2 30 
RBO created 25 0.800 0.4082 0 1 
Institutions dismantled 17 0.5882 0.5072 0 1 
Disputes over quality 23 0.5217 0.5107 0 1 
Disputes over allocation 23 0.3478 0.4869 0 1 
Problems before decentralization (PC 
variable) 15 2.41e-09 0.9482 -2.3690 2.4236 
Problems after the decentralization (PC 
variable) 10 -1.34e-08 0.9765 -1.1872 1.3384 




Table 11. Decision making in water management at various levels before and after 
decentralization 
Activity Before After t-Statistic 
Water Administration 
Local  2.235 2.692 0.8785 
Basin 1.611 3.733 6.0498*** 
State 2.875 3.125 0.3369 
Central Government 3.950 2.533 -2.7947*** 
Infrastructure Financing 
Local  1.917 2.400 0.9659 
Basin 1.286 2.714 2.4019** 
State 3.222 3.125 -0.1453 
Central Government 4.714 4.667 -0.1166 
Water Quality Enforcement 
Local  1.500 1.800 0.7069 
Basin 1.529 3.273 3.7063*** 
State 2.750 2.500 -0.4229 
Central Government 4.000 3.286 -1.8609* 
Setting Water Quality Standards 
Local  1.200 1.000 -0.5311 
Basin 1.333 2.333 2.3094** 
State 2.083 2.714 0.9073 
Central Government 4.600 4.571 -0.1031 
                        Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
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Table 12. Changes in severity of various water management issue between before and 
after decentralization 
Problem Item Before After t-Statistic 
Floods 0.9545 0.7222 1.5396+ 
Water Scarcity 1.0952 0.4705 3.6246*** 
Environmental Quality 1.1052 0.2666 3.5794*** 
Water Conflicts 1.3888 0.2666 4.5825*** 
Land Degradation  1.0500 0.7500 1.6771* 
Development Issues 1.3333 0.6153 3.5257** 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.15. We included also coefficients with level of 




Table 13. Estimated features of the decentralization process  
Estimation 
































































































Number of obs 16 14 11 10 9 
F-test 7.42 6.83 5.18 8.4 285.08 
Prob> F 0.0038 0.0091 0.0377 0.0302 0.0035 
R-squared 0.7295 0.8103 0.7754 0.9131 0.9988 
Adj R-squared 0.6312 0.6918 0.6257 0.8045 0.9953 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. + significant at 15%,* significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5% , *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 14. Estimated decentralization performance equations 
Estimation 













































































Number of obs 10 9 9 7 
F-test 33.71 276.39 233.62 26.84 
Prob> F 0.0008 0.0003 0.0004 0.0114 
R-squared 0.9642 0.9978 0.9974 0.9641 
Adj R-squared 0.9356 0.9942 0.9932 0.9282 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. + significant at 15%,* significant at 10%, ** 









Figure 1 Geographical location of the interviewed RBOs 
Source: Adapted from DNTF data, 2011 
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Figure 2 Major River Basins in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: Adapted from DNTF data, 2011 
